Acta Cogitata: An Undergraduate Journal in Philosophy
Volume 9

Article 1

2021

Acta Cogitata - Volume 9
Mac Neaville
Eastern Michigan University

W. John Koolage

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.emich.edu/ac
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Neaville, Mac and Koolage, W. John (2021) "Acta Cogitata - Volume 9," Acta Cogitata: An Undergraduate
Journal in Philosophy: Vol. 9 , Article 1.
Available at: https://commons.emich.edu/ac/vol9/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History & Philosophy at DigitalCommons@EMU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Acta Cogitata: An Undergraduate Journal in Philosophy by an authorized editor
of DigitalCommons@EMU. For more information, please contact lib-ir@emich.edu.

Contents

2

Letter from the Editor

3

Chloe Berger
“A Case for Creating Clearly Condemnatory Statues of Wrongdoers”

15

Omar Khali
“Hegel, Marx, and the Realization of the Self in Work: Towards a
Humanistic Ontology of Labor”

30

Jay Nelson
“Laughter as a Critical Tool for Liberation”

39

Marshall Pierce
“On the Deconstruction of Metaphysics: Heidegger’s Critical
Ontology in Being and Time”

60

Hailey V. Smith
“Palouse Prairie: Ethics Behind the Loss of an Ecosystem”

74

Frank Hernández
“Wittgenstein on Reasonable Doubt and Calling Bullshit”

1

Letter from the Editor
Though this issue of Acta Cogitata may look largely similar to past issues, the conditions
that produced it are unique. Finding ourselves in a worldwide pandemic changed the ways we
did philosophy, in both format and content. The struggle that burdened countless people cannot
be overlooked, and in times such as this philosophy must persist and articulate responses to
injustices and widely promoted falsehoods. In recognizing the suffering endured this past year,
we sought out silver linings from which hope could spring and in such conditions this iteration of
the journal was produced. I want to recognize each person involved in this journal as a
contributor to the positive movement forward. We adapted to new formats, as our Undergraduate
Conference each author took part in was entirely online for the first time, but this had the benefit
of making it accessible to authors from different parts of the world and country. From the
obstacles of this past year we have found new and beneficial ways of thinking and acting and
that is something we can be grateful for.
As with past issues, my goal was to represent diverse interests within philosophy. In spite
of this diversity, or rather in virtue of it perhaps, a common thread emerged this year in which
each contribution to this journal represents a looking-forward: an observation of the
shortcomings of traditional discourses and society-at large, and a constructive project that seeks
to move us forward. In each article, our authors make forceful, critical arguments that challenge
us to encounter our collective future in a new way, whether that involves a different orientation
toward language, viewing our own productivity as an expression of humanity, or seeing relics of
past injustices as sites of potential resistance.
Without the support of colleagues and faculty, this iteration of Acta could not have
happened. I want to thank Lauren Williams for heading up the task of organizing the
undergraduate conference and ensuring the process of bringing the conference and journal to
fruition was done properly. I must thank my advisor and Editor-in-Chief Dr. John Koolage as his
guidance was and will continue to be crucial to this journal. Above all, I thank everyone who
engaged in this journal and the undergraduate conference as each individual provided unique
value and made this experience what it has been.
Mac Neaville, Student Editor
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A Case for Creating Clearly Condemnatory Status of Wrongdoers
Chloe Berger
Bryn Mawr College
Abstract: In recent work discussing how we should address public statues of wrongdoers,
people typically argue for either removing statues or retaining them, often with the addition of a
contextualizing plaque, counter-commemoration, or other alteration.1 In contrast to mere
removal or modification, I argue that one permissible alternative is to create clearly
condemnatory statues of wrongdoers, but only for wrongdoers with already existing statues. That
is, we need not create statues of every wrongdoer; we should only create them following removal
of the originals. While my arguments apply to wrongdoers generally, including confederates,
colonizers, and genocidaires, I focus on Columbus as a wrongdoer and the Columbus statue in
Marconi Plaza in Philadelphia.2 First, I outline Helen Frowe’s argument for our duty to remove
statues of wrongdoers as part of the state’s duty to condemn and repudiate wrongdoing. While I
do not frame my argument in terms of duties, building on Frowe’s claims, I argue that one
permissible way of condemning and repudiating wrongdoing is to create condemnatory statues,
and in cases involving serious rights violators, we ought to prefer creation of these statues over
mere removal.3 I also draw on accounts of the value of blame to show how blame – and
particularly the blame that condemnatory statues convey – demonstrates our commitment to
morality. Finally, I address alternative options of retaining the statue and either adding a plaque,
counter-commemoration, or vandalization, to illuminate some reasons why we might prefer
condemnatory statues.
1

When I use the term “wrongdoers” in this essay, it is limited to those who are serious rights violators, as articulated
in Helen Frowe’s account (8). My account is limited to statues of individual wrongdoers, rather than
commemorations of groups that commit wrongs, groups that contain some wrongdoers, or other portrayals of
wrongdoing that do not depict individual wrongdoers.
2
The Columbus statue before and after being boarded up. In August 2020, its removal was approved by the
Philadelphia Art Commission, but when the removal was legally challenged, a judge paused the process while
waiting to hear related motions. In April 2021, a new lawsuit was filed opposing the removal. In August 2021, a
judge ruled that the city may not remove the statue, but the city plans to appeal, and the statue is still boarded up.
3
When I say, “we ought to prefer,” I do not mean that we must respond to all statues of serious rights violators by
creating condemnatory statues. While specific responses to each statue will be largely context-dependent, we should
make our condemnation of serious rights violators salient, and often, mere removal does not clearly or sufficiently
express condemnation. For example, if a statue has recently sparked protests, local governments often cite public
safety as a reason for removal, while failing to condemn the wrongdoer’s actions. Or the government might remove
the statue at night, so as not to attract attention or protest, and fail to provide reasons for the removal. In contrast, a
condemnatory removal might involve the government issuing a condemnatory statement upon removal and then
installing a condemnatory plaque so that the condemnation remains publicly visible. Although both this
condemnatory removal and the creation of a condemnatory statue are permissible responses, below I address reasons
why creating condemnatory statues can better condemn wrongdoers and convey our commitment to morality than
can mere removal.

3

First, I should clarify what constitutes a “clearly condemnatory” statue. Helen Frowe
argues that statues often convey a positive evaluative attitude of a historical figure, and that
“states have duties to repudiate their own historical wrongdoing, and to condemn other people’s
serious wrongdoing,” and these duties are incompatible with expressing positive evaluations of
wrongdoers through public statues (1). When Frowe mentions that her argument does not support
a duty to remove clearly condemnatory statues, she notes that most statues are not condemnatory,
since “they merely depict the person (often in a manner meant to convey their heroic or
otherwise admirable status), and they are erected as expressions of esteem” and “denote a
positive evaluation” of a historical figure (3). In contrast to these positive evaluations,
condemnatory works involve negative evaluation, meant to convey the wrongdoer’s vicious or
contemptible status, created as expressions of condemnation. But this blaming does not license
malicious ridicule, as our main aim in condemning is to convey our commitment to our moral
principles and our repudiation of the wrongdoer’s bad actions or values.
I do not adopt a specific account of blame in my above outline of the features of a clearly
condemnatory statue. So, a condemnatory statue could express a judgment of blameworthiness,
provoke reactive attitudes constitutive of blame, morally protest the actions or values of the
wrongdoer, and so on. But whatever account of blame one chooses to adopt, she can envision
condemnatory works that align with her views; her constraints are self-imposed and imaginative
rather than author-imposed and definitional. Because public art has enhanced capacities to
communicate commitments and encourage emotional responses in its viewers compared to other
ways of blaming, I mainly address the communicative and affective aspects of condemnation.
To illustrate what a condemnatory statue might look like, below I have created an
example of a clearly condemnatory statue that could replace the Columbus statue following its
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removal.4 Aligning with my definition of a clearly condemnatory work, this statue does not
honor, esteem, nor denote a positive evaluation of Columbus. The “hate” letters express a
negative evaluation and have a double meaning, in that we convey our hatred of Columbus’
wrongdoing while portraying him as hateful figure, given his enslavement, murder, and other
mistreatment and manipulation of indigenous people. Rather than depicting him as a heroic
figure looking down on viewers, he is the same size and on the same level as viewers and,
importantly, he is the same size as the bold “hate” letters, so his figure does not overshadow our
condemnation. Indeed, he is now positioned in the shadow of hatred: no longer towering over his
colonial conquests, the oppressor becomes oppressed under the weight of the hatred his actions
and attitudes convey.5

4

Although this statue is not proportional to the actual sizes of the Love and Columbus statues, this is how I imagine
one example of a clearly condemnatory statue.
5
While I only address individual wrongdoers here, for examples of other works that I consider clearly
condemnatory and directed towards group wrongdoing (in this case, that of the Mexican government), see this video
on Mexico’s anti-monuments. <https://youtu.be/9byeq7LP050>. One aim of anti-monuments is protesting how the
government has addressed, or failed to address, tragedies or wrongdoing. Though I do not argue that moral protest is
essential to blame, the protest of these anti-monuments seems to blame or negatively evaluate the government for
failing to appropriately address wrongdoing.

5

Having clarified what constitutes a clearly condemnatory statue, I now address Frowe’s
argument for the duty to remove statues of wrongdoers and I build on her claims to argue that
one permissible way of condemning and repudiating wrongdoing is to create condemnatory
statues. I focus on showing that mere removal is insufficient condemnation and offer reasons
why we should prefer condemnatory statues, and because I agree both that the original statues
express positive evaluations of wrongdoers and with Frowe’s argument for removal, I do not
restate all of her claims. Frowe asserts that “[k]eeping public statues of serious rights violators is
incompatible with the state’s duties to condemn and repudiate serious wrongdoing” grounded in
what is owed to victims of wrongdoing (2). Regarding repudiation, Frowe states that it “requires,
amongst other things, a public and sincere declaration of an act’s wrongfulness, and a
commitment to not facilitate such wrongdoing in the future,” which is incompatible with publicly
honoring wrongdoers through statues (11). Similarly, the value of a state’s condemnation is that
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it “reflects our intrinsic reasons to affirm victims’ moral standing in the face of actions that have
denied that standing by publicly asserting the wrongfulness of those actions” (12).
In comparison to creating a condemnatory statue, merely removing a statue does not
declare an act’s wrongfulness, a future commitment to improved actions, nor victims’ moral
worth. That is, merely removing a statue expressing a positive evaluation does not equate
expressing a negative evaluation. Likewise, mere withdrawal of praise is not blame, and merely
removing a racist statue does not make one anti-racist. Considering that these statues aim to
communicate our values, declaring that we are no longer committed to some value does not
positively articulate the values to which we are presently committed, nor those to which we will
commit ourselves in the future. Since statues can serve as reminders of the commitments they
convey, creating condemnatory statues can fulfill Frowe’s aim of conveying our commitment not
to enable future wrongdoing, whereas mere removal does not convey nor remind us of this
commitment. Moreover, while Frowe claims that condemnation must be sincere, mere removal is
less sincere than creating condemnatory works. In discussing condemnation, Frowe connects its
sincerity to the idea that “justice should not only be done, but also be seen to be done” (13). Yet,
in the case of mere removal of statues, after the removal, nothing is seen at all; we are left with
an empty plot of land, which does not come close to the sincere declaration of wrongfulness, nor
the affirmation of victims’ worth, that Frowe seeks. In contrast, creating clearly condemnatory
statues makes the declaration of a perpetrator’s wrongfulness sincere, visible, and lasting, and
thus is a permissible way that the state can repudiate and condemn wrongdoing.
One might object to my argument for the creation of condemnatory statues and assert that
since most of the wrongdoers are dead, we have no reason to blame them, since they cannot
apologize, change their values, or produce any future good. Opponents might similarly claim that
we should not blame wrongdoers when, according to the context of their times, their views were
7

not as egregious as we currently consider them to be. I respond to this second concern by noting
that if we agree that our moral principles are universal and apply across time, we can still blame
wrongdoers who lived in different social contexts. As George Sher states, “given that all moral
principles apply to all persons, we may indeed conclude that whenever someone accepts a
principle as moral. . . he must have not only a motivationally effective desire to obey it himself,
but also a variety of motivationally ineffective desires that others obey it as well,” and desires
that people obeyed it in the past (126). While I do not adopt Sher’s belief-desire pair account of
blame, I agree that a commitment to blame is inseparable from a commitment to morality (115).
To address the objection that we ought not blame wrongdoers if they are dead and
incapable of reforming and contributing to future good, I maintain that while there can be good
consequences of condemnation, I am more focused on blame as serving to defend and articulate
our moral commitments and the intrinsic value of affirming victims’ worth, rather than
instrumental benefits of condemnation. Because I focus on the connection between blame and
our commitment to morality, I do not think that the only value of blame is in its ability to reform
wrongdoers, indeed, I prefer to focus on how blaming might aid victims of wrongdoing.
Christopher Evan Franklin also focuses on victims while arguing for a conceptual
connection between blame and a commitment to morality, arguing that we are required to protect
and defend objects of moral worth, and only blame can provide the requisite defense and
protection (215). In particular, Franklin claims that blame defends an object’s moral worth,
avoids your complicity in disvaluing the object upon failing to defend it, and avoids your failure
to recognize an object of moral worth as important. Franklin states: “to defend moral values
involves expressing our condemnation of the act [which disvalues a valuable object] . . . we
make it clear that we disagree with and will not stand for that kind of action” (220). These
expressive and functional dimensions of blame support the public expression of blame, such as
8

through the creation of condemnatory public statues, rather than a more private or less salient
condemnation. As Franklin notes, “publicly blaming the agent can serve to bring others to a
recognition of the value of the object in question or to sustain the beliefs of those who already
recognize it as valuable” (220).
Blaming wrongdoers shows that we value objects of moral worth in the sense that when
someone commits a wrong, they fail to show proper moral concern for the people whose rights
they violate. So when we blame the wrongdoer, we show that we value victims of wrongdoing
and their descendants, that we do not condone the mistreatment of members of our moral
community who are worthy of moral concern. And, as Franklin articulates above, blaming not
only makes salient the moral worth of victims of wrongdoing for those who already believe they
are worthy of concern, but also for those who failed to view victims and their descendants as
valuable. Blame’s contribution to making community members recognize the value of victims is
especially important under nonideal oppressive conditions, since oppressed groups are less likely
to be seen as valuable parts of the community and have their interests and well-being prioritized
by their oppressors. So even if we cannot dismantle oppressive systems in a single blaming
interaction, through the creation of condemnatory statues, we can at least communicate to the
oppressed that we regard them as worthy of moral concern and we oppose their mistreatment.6

6

One might worry that since I claim that the state can blame wrongdoers through condemnatory statues, and in a
democracy, the state is composed of citizens, I am therefore claiming that all citizens blame wrongdoers, when in
fact, some citizens view wrongdoers – such as Columbus – as admirable and would be deeply upset by a
condemnatory statue. To respond, first, I note that we can still outline some basic values that everyone should agree
on, even if everyone does not actually agree. In this essay, I assume that all citizens should condemn serious rights
violators. We should not forgo blaming serious rights violators merely because some people admire them. And if we
want to maintain that colonialism is universally bad, we should still publicly condemn colonizers. The fact that some
community members admire colonizers does not mean that colonizers are good, nor that people who praise
colonizers are justified in praising them. Second, more generally, I think no statue will represent all citizens, or even
all Philadelphians. People’s views on wrongdoers vary widely and are often too nuanced to be fully conveyed
through simple statues. Likewise, within a community, people’s values are often conflicting and incommensurable.
So it is not the case that the community was in perfect agreement, and creating a condemnatory statue is the state’s
first non-neutral statement. Retaining a statue of a wrongdoer is also not neutral; indeed, it conveys a lack of moral
concern for the wrongdoer’s victims and their descendants.
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We can see how public art in particular can serve as an effective way to encourage
condemnation of wrongdoers if, in our account of blame, we define it as involving experiencing
certain reactive attitudes. Since public art often provokes emotional responses in viewers, we can
support the creation of condemnatory statues, as opposed to condemnatory texts or other
assertions that may not generate as strong an emotional response in the audience. While we
cannot obligate people to feel the negative attitudes involved in blame upon viewing a statue, the
state should still publicly condemn wrongdoing and defend values through creating
condemnatory statues. Even if not every viewer will experience the attitudes associated with
blame, they can still understand the condemnatory message that the work communicates, and
having the statue as a public reminder of what they ought to condemn may gradually encourage
the negative attitudes involved in blame, or at least positive attitudes towards victims.
Now, to address to a preservationist objection, one might claim that in removing statues,
we eliminate the opportunity to engage in democratic dialogue regarding the wrongdoing, our
history, and our current values. But unlike mere removal, creating a condemnatory statue does
not foreclose dialogue, rather, the dialogue would be grounded in a negative evaluation instead
of a positive one. So, we retain our dialogue while better articulating and defending our values.7
I now turn to the inadequacy of plaques, counter-commemorations, and vandalism as
alternatives to condemnatory statues. I do not oppose all instances of plaques, as condemnatory
works can often benefit from clarification or contextualization in plaque form. I only claim that,
regarding the original statues of wrongdoers, a contextualizing plaque does not adequately

7

Some people who favor preservation are also concerned with potential damage to old statues caused by the
removal. The August 2021 ruling – which can be accessed through this news article
<www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/christopher-columbus-statue-can-remain-in-south-philly-judgerules/2929988/> – declaring that the city may not remove the Columbus statue cites concerns about damage to the
marble (2-3), as well as the city’s “duty to preserve and protect historical objects” (6). My argument for clearly
condemnatory statues can accommodate these preservationist worries about damaging original works. This is
because condemnatory statues can be built around the originals, similar to the “hate” letters placed over the original
Columbus statue in the example I present above.
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condemn wrongdoing nor demonstrate our commitment to morality. Part of expressing our
commitment to morality is not just praising those who are virtuous, but also identifying those
who violate our moral principles, which also shows moral concern for wrongdoers’ victims. By
keeping a statue and adding a plaque, you still retain the honoring and positive evaluation aspects
of the statue, which are typically more salient than the plaque. That is, it is not enough to merely
state that the wrongs occurred through providing historical context, we also must condemn those
wrongs. The ambivalence of a prominent positive statue and an easily overlooked condemnatory
plaque is often insufficient to adequately condemn serious rights violators.
Regarding counter-commemorations, Frowe opposes their creation by stating that they
imply wrongdoers and non-wrongdoers are “merely two sides of the same story – their actions
on a moral par, their views equally reasonable, both worthy of respect,” and “This implication is
morally objectionable,” since retaining statues of wrongdoers continues to honor them, and
wrongdoers do not deserve positive evaluation (7). I endorse Frowe’s view, and further claim
that even if the wrongdoer were removed and only the non-wrongdoer remained, this would be
insufficient condemnation, for the reasons articulated above in claiming that removal is
insufficient. While I do not oppose creating statues of admirable figures, we cannot convey our
commitment to moral principles merely by highlighting instances in which people fulfill them,
we must also condemn wrongdoers who flout them.
With respect to vandalism, in his defense of vandalizing tainted commemorations,
Chong-Ming Lim contrasts the aims of activists and preservationists, stating, “Activists seek to
secure self-respect. . . Preservationists seek to secure public engagement with the past” (197),
and he articulates how vandalism can fulfill the values of self-respect and remembrance. While I
do not oppose his argument for vandalism, I argue that creating condemnatory statues meets the
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aims of both groups while better condemning wrongdoers.8 First, a condemnatory statue still
facilitates public engagement with the past, which is the aim of preservationists. As noted above,
creating condemnatory statues still allows us to discuss the wrongdoer and their actions, but
rather than publicly praising the wrongdoer, our discussion is based on a negative evaluation.
Second, in relation to activists’ aim of securing respect, we should not only be concerned
with activists’ self-respect, but also others’ respect for activists. Respect need not be our only
concern when evaluating statues, but focusing on respect for activists reflects the reality that
people angered by vandalism may retaliate, as when Columbus statue “defenders” assaulted
activists advocating its removal.9 Not all preservationists “defend” statues violently, but this
violence is not an isolated incidence. Since this Columbus-related assault was prompted by mere
protest, we have even more reason to be concerned about the violence vandalism might provoke.
Even if vandalism were legalized, because it involves vandalizers’ visibility, it exposes them to
assault. So, if we are concerned with respect, and respect encompasses bodily integrity, we ought
to prefer condemnatory statues. The state better condemns wrongdoing by creating
condemnatory statues, which involves affirming victims’ worth and committing not to facilitate
future wrongdoing, whereas allowing activists to be assaulted does not affirm their worth and
enables assaulters’ wrongdoing. Risking assault should not be the cost of securing respect.

8

It is important to note that Lim defends vandalism in the context of a state’s refusal to remove tainted
commemorations, so he is not arguing for vandalism as an alternative to removal. And in cases in which the state
will not remove statues, they may be even less likely to create new condemnatory statues. Though if the state values
preservation, they might be willing to build a condemnatory statue around the original. In cases in which the state
rejects removal and condemnatory statues, we may support the creation of condemnatory contextualization, such as
a contextualizing plaque or other exhibit near the statue, as an initial step towards more complete condemnation in
the future. Even though it is unlikely that those who admire wrongdoers will immediately change their views and
support condemnatory statues, condemnatory contextualization could at least encourage people to reconsider their
views and confront the truth about the extent of the wrongdoing.
9

The state’s failure to condemn wrongdoing enabled “defenders” to “swarm around them [activists], punch them,
push them to the ground, kick and stomp on them, burn them with lighters, cigarettes and cigars, sexually assault
them, and shove them into busy Broad Street traffic,” as detailed in this article.
<www.inquirer.com/news/columbus-statue-black-lives-matter-krasner-philadelphia-marconi-vigilantes20200616.html>.

12

Instead, the state should assume the risks of the wrathful reactions of dissatisfied “defenders,”
and create clearly condemnatory statues.

13
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Hegel, Marx, and the Realization of the Self in Work: Towards a Humanistic
Ontology of Labor
Omar Khali
Eastern Michigan University
Abstract: It has become evident in advanced capitalism that the worker’s relation between their
labor and their selfhood remains unclear and distorted. For many, labor is merely a means for
putting food on the table and a roof over their head. This does not mean, however, that labor in
itself gives rise to this prevailing relation. The objective of this essay is to uncover a fundamental
ontological characteristic of labor; namely, its ability to reflect one’s subjectivity and capabilities
as a human being. I attempt to demonstrate, through thinkers such as Karl Marx and G. W. F.
Hegel, that the worker's labor and the exchange of their products are intimately connected with
their selfhood—whether they see themselves as creative, competent, and so on. Furthermore, I
argue that the advanced capitalist mode of production has distorted this essential relationship to
labor, thus estranging the worker from their labor and subjectivity.

Introduction
When a manufacturing company has to resort to installing large nets outside its buildings
to prevent employees from committing suicide, the grim and contorted relationship the
employees have with their work becomes clear.1 Under advanced capitalism, a system in which
most of the world’s population currently participates, the general apprehension of the essential
relationship between labor and being human is noticeably obscure. The instability of this present
"understanding" of the relation is demonstrated by frequent worker strikes and the need for
"suicide nets" on manufacturing buildings. And this issue is not something which has recently
developed; through the centuries of capitalist rule, this ill-defined concept of labor as it relates
to human experience has become increasingly unclear and distorted. The reasons for this
1

I am referring to a Foxconn manufacturing plant in Shenzhen, China. This plant manufactures hardware for
various technology companies, one of which is Apple.
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contortion are numerous and would require an intensive investigation. My object of study is not
to look at labor in terms of its functions within the political economy—how labor affects the
value of a product, the price of labor as determined by the intersection of supply and demand,
etc. Rather, my concern is directed towards the being of labor as it relates to selfhood and being
human. The objective of this essay is to uncover a fundamental ontological characteristic of
labor; namely, its ability to reflect one’s subjectivity and capabilities as a human being. Guided
by the writings of Karl Marx and G. W. F. Hegel, I expound upon this property in the first and
second sections of the following essay. The first illustrates how one’s unique human
capacities—creativity, intelligence, etc.— can be expressed and cultivated primarily through
labor, the objective transformation of the world. The second section attempts to demonstrate
how the subjectivity reflected in one’s creation (or product) attains certitude only when that
creation is used and recognized by another. I contend in the last section that once the intimate
interrelation between labor and human subjectivity is neglected, forms of labor that estrange and
disconnect workers from their creation (and thereby from their subjectivity and from one
another) become socially and politically permissible.
Subjectivity and Labor
In order to observe how engaging in labor serves as a transformation and reflection of
one’s sense of self, we must direct our attention towards the conditions which allow for this
intimate relationship to exist. However, before we do that, it is important that we make the
general distinction between the activities of an animal and the labor of human beings. Broadly
speaking, the animal’s laborious activities that are necessary for maintaining its physical
existence are what determine the life of its particular species; or as Marx notes, “[t]he animal
is its life activity.”2 The effort involved in a bird building its nests and its search for
2

Karl Marx, Marx: Selected Writings, ed. Lawrence H. Simon (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company,
1994), 63.
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earthworms and mulberries constitute the limitations of what it is capable of. Even when the
animal’s life is not dominated by the activities necessary for maintaining its life, that is to say
if its environment is relatively safe from predators and there is a sufficient supply of food, it
does not follow from this that creativity and reason suddenly come into fruition. Conversely,
these aforementioned faculties begin to germinate and are made manifest when a human being
is liberated from the incessant demand to preserve their own biological life—this will be
further discussed later in this section. A cursory glance at the world would suffice in noticing
that humans are endowed with abilities far more sophisticated than those of animals. It is the
“practical creation of an objective world”—the houses, cars, tools, art, and so on—that
displays the multitude of unique capabilities inherent in being human. Moreover, we cannot
help but heed the diverse ways in which these abilities take form in the transformation of the
material world. Think, for example, of how something as basic and simple as sustenance has
become something which defines a culture and is an expression of artistry. It is in this process
of creating and affecting the world that human beings develop their sense of self—that which
constitutes one’s individuality and unique character. However, I must be cautious in this
generality, for not all humans find (and have found) their labor to be a source of their
selfhood. It has only been those who are capable of exercising agency over their creations that
have found their labor to be an expression of who they are and what they are capable of.
Intellect, creativity, ingenuity, skill, and so on, are those human qualities that one is capable
of expressing and utilizing in one’s transformation of the world. So, to see these human
capabilities freely expressed in labor, we need to observe the situation where the worker feels
as if their activity is “a definite way of expressing their life.”3
One might suppose that living a life comparable to a prehistoric human, a human

3

Marx, 107.
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unfettered from the restraints of others, constitutes a free relationship with their labor and its
products. This is problematic simply because a human in this primitive state is confined to
activities that are similar to those of an animal. Living outside an organized society or a polis
would entail living without a structured division of labor, and thus in some form of state of
nature. Alone and dependent on only themselves to obtain sustenance, the human would spend
most of their waking hours hunting and scavenging for food. There is no relationship to their
labor that allows them to find themselves and their potential in the products of their labor. The
spear they make is not constructed for any reason but to use it for killing wild boar. Most of the
time of the human’s day is spent expending energy on activities necessary for maintaining their
biological existence, a life similar to an animal. So in this sense, they are not free and the
conditions are such that the idea of cultivating a sense of self (what they are capable of and so
forth) through creation, is nonexistent. We are able to locate those engaged in genuine creation
only in some form of organized community or society. As Marx remarks: “Only in community
do the means exist for every individual to cultivate his talents in all directions. Only in the
community is personal freedom possible.”4 And the conditions for an individual to ‘cultivate his
talents’ in labor can be found throughout various economic modes of production; although it is
in capitalism that we find this particular relationship to labor taking on alienating and often
restrictive forms. Marx notes that even during feudalism, many had a relative degree of freedom
in their craft and were able to find their labor reflecting their character. He states in the German
Ideology that:
[t]he medieval craftsman still exhibited an interest in their special work and their skill
in it which could develop to a certain limited artistic talent. For that very reason every
medieval craftsman was completely absorbed in his work, had a contented slavish
relationship to it, and was subjected to it to a far greater extent than is the modern
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worker for whom his work is a matter of indifference.5
Despite master craftsmen being required to get permission from the guild in order to be
self-employed, there were not many restrictions impeding on their craft. Similarly, when we
look at the very few in capitalism that have the privilege of working for themselves, insofar as
they own the products they produce and are actively engaged in the craft, we find a relationship
to labor that closely resembles that of the master craftsman.
Thus far, we have yet to get at the concrete ways in which labor and subjectivity are
intimately connected. To understand the way subjectivity is apprehended and cultivated
through labor, we must direct our attention to the situation where the worker is free, or at least
relatively free, in their creation. That being said, let us observe a self-employed carpenter
during the nascent stages of capitalism. Although, we could very well look at a master
craftsman or journeyman during feudalism and still observe the worker acquiring a sense of
who they are through their labor.
The carpenter who is able to exercise complete control over her product is, at the most
fundamental level, able to see the process of work in terms of potentiality and actuality. Before
commencing with the activity of building a chair, she must first devise a general image or model
of it. In this particular stage of production, the carpenter envisages the chair in various forms;
which is to say that it has the potential of taking on different shapes and structures. Once a
rough blueprint has been established, she then proceeds to cut the wood and collect the
necessary materials. It is in this process that she actively actualizes the possibility of the raw
material being transformed into a chair; and throughout this endeavor, the desired end is always
subject to change. For instance, after mounting the splat (the back part of the chair) on the chair,
she notices that its convex shape does not suit the overall aesthetic of the creation; so as a result,

5

Marx, 135.

19

she constructs one that is aesthetically congruent with the surrounding parts. In The Human
Condition, Hannah Arendt succinctly assorts this process into two parts: “first, perceiving the
image or shape of the product-to-be, and then organizing the means and starting the execution.”6
What is of vital importance here is that it is the carpenter who precisely transformed the
world in a constructive and creative manner. When the individual sees themselves as the subject
(or agent) that propels the creation process, from the conception of the form (eidos) to the
material actualization of that potential, the idea they have of themselves is reinforced. In other
words, their skills, knowledge, creativity, etc, that are embodied in the chair they built become
tangible and concrete evidence that those characteristics are a part of who they are. In
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel contends something quite similar in his account of the
condition of the slave in the master-slave dialectic. He states that the slave’s “formative activity
is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now, in the
work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence.”7After having physically altered the
world in a constructive way (through work), the bondsman’s sense of self or “individuality”
becomes something concrete rather than vague and determined solely by the master. Alexandre
Kojève, in his transcribed lectures on Phenomenology of Spirit, expands on Hegel's analysis of
work by remarking that,“[i]t is the realization of his project, of his idea...it is he that is realized
in and by this product.”8Furthermore, he adds the following: “In his work, he transforms things
and he transforms himself at the sametime; he forms things and the world by transforming
himself,
educating himself…”9 This active transformation of oneself through one’s productive
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activity is especially pertinent when it comes to taking on new projects that require the
acquisition of additional skills and knowledge. The carpenter’s determination to build a French
bergère, a type of upholstered armchair, demonstrates this dual transformation of the subject and
the creation. She is initially confident in her ability to take on such a formidable project;
however, as she begins cutting the wood and configuring the various parts, she gradually comes
to recognize that her present capabilities are no match for the elegant and sophisticated design of
this particular chair. The limitations of her aptitude in carpentry are disclosed when she fails or
falls short in building something intricate and new. It is in virtue of this revelation, however, that
she retreats from the hands-on work in order to study various skills and techniques that are
applicable for the construction of bergères. And her newly acquired skills and knowledge about
bergères are realized only in its objectification, in the material application of her abilities. In
other words, it is only once she successfully transforms the wood into the intricate chair that she
can physically locate the cultivation and expansion of her knowledge, creativity, embodied skill,
etc. After this formative experience, after altering the real objective world by presenting it with
another expression of human feat, does the carpenter find herself transformed. However, one’s
personal evaluation of their creation, and thereby of their capabilities and talents, does not
necessarily provide apodictic truth; it may very well be that the chair the carpenter designed is
hideous. Seeing oneself in the object is certainly a necessary condition for realizing one’s
subjectivity, but it is not the sufficient condition. The way others respond to one’s creation must
also be accounted for when thinking about how one’s productive activity operates as a reflection
of their subjectivity. To understand why this is the case, let us explore Hegel’s theory of
recognition.
Subjectivity, the Object, and the Other
One of the crucial takeaways from Hegel’s theory of recognition, developed in the fourth
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chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit, is that it is through the other that one acquires a more
concrete understanding of who they are. The reason that self-consciousness (i.e. the individual)
fights the other is in virtue of its desires to attain “the truth of this recognition as an independent
self-consciousness.”10 Which is to say simply that the individual wants the other to recognize
them as independent and free in order to corroborate a feature of their being which they hold to
be true (that is, that they are a free and independent being). And while an object produced by
work serves as a means for individuals to recognize their subjectivity, as illustrated in the
previous section, it nonetheless remains limited in that it is only the individual producing the
object who is determining the value of the object. This solipsistic determination engenders a onesided evaluation of the object, and thereby a one-sided grasp of themselves and their capabilities.
Let us return to the case of the carpenter to observe this relation. When the carpenter is finally
finished constructing the French bergère, and finds herself satisfied and proud of her creation,
her sentiments remain merely personal. For her positive assessment of the chair, and of herself,
is deprived of a comprehensive and complete truth; or as Hegel would articulate, her own “selfcertainty still has no truth.”11 For all she knows, the values she attributes to herself (creative,
intelligent, skillful, capable of building a bergère, etc) may very well be illusory or exaggerated.
It is precisely because of this partial evaluation of herself that makes others serve an imperative
role in apprehending one’s self. In Arendt’s discussion on action and its way of disclosing the
actor’s character, she writes: “This revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore
where people are with others...in sheer human togetherness.”12 The worker’s labor, similar to the
actor and their actions, is truly revealed only when it affects the human world. Supporting this
claim, Kojève states that, “...he must impose the idea that he has of himself on a being other than
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himself: he must be recognized by the others.”13 Translating this in terms of productive activity
and subjectivity, the individual must impose their creation on others in order to ascertain whether
their assessment of it contains any truth; and the way to discover this is through exchanging or
selling their very creation. Whether or not another individual will feel compelled to purchase the
chair is the chief affirmation of the carpenter’s sentiment that the chair is aesthetically unique,
intricate, functional, etc; and by extension, whether she is capable of building a bergère that is
functional and pleasing to the eye. With creations like paintings or sculptures, the situation
becomes a bit more complex; one culture or generation might deem a work of art to possess
beauty while another might not. However, for the time being, we will put aside this particular
matter and concern ourselves mostly with everyday objects and utilities. Additionally, what
comes with this exchange is an active communication with others about the very objects the
individual creates. This aforementioned feature, while it may appear to be inconsequential,
proves to be rather essential for transforming oneself and one’s future creations. For instance, a
few who purchased chairs from the carpenter informed her that a couple of the bolts were loose;
because of this response, she felt an obligation to be more diligent and attentive when bolting on
the legs. From then on she developed a sense of astuteness when it came to assembling the parts.
Notice how this communication with others functions as a reflection of her capacities and its
limitations. Her idea that the chairs she built were firmly constructed remains private until others
use and appropriate the object, the material manifestation of her subjectivity. Furthermore, it is
important to keep in mind that work which is reflective of subjectivity and agency is contingent
on a set of conditions that make such a relationship with creation possible. We will see in the
following section how neglecting this understanding of labor—as an activity that is intimately
connected to subjectivity—can result in degraded relations to productive activity.
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The Distortion of Labor in Industrial Capitalism
From the depiction of labor as explicated above, we obtain two fundamental
conclusions: (1) Productive activity and the objects created are material realizations of one’s
subjectivity, abilities, agency, humanity,etc. And, having a free relationship with labor allows
for these aforementioned features to be cultivated and expanded. (2) The value one attributes to
the objects they create are affirmed or denied by observing the way the objects transform the
social objective world—that is, the way others use and respond to the objects they produce.
Industrial capitalism has demonstrated an irreverence to this understanding of labor in a
multitude of ways. However, there are two that I want to focus on which are relevant to the
previous sections: the widespread fragmentation of productive activity and the worker’s
detachment from those who purchase the objects they “produce.”
Given that capitalists own most of the property and the means of production (raw
materials, buildings, tools, etc), those who do not own anything but their labor (the workers, the
majority) are forced to sell it to the capitalist as a means to survive. This unilateral distribution
of power has allowed the capitalists to have authority over the conditions of production, which
is to say that they are the ones who control what is being produced and how it is produced. The
latter detail explains the extensive employment of the mechanized division of labor. And by
“division of labor” in this context, I am not referring to the macro division of labor we see in
any organized society where each person takes on a different vocation (some are bakers, some
are doctors, etc). The mechanized division of labor I speak of is the type Adam Smith promotes
in The Wealth of Nations, and what we see occurring in most manufactures today. In these large
manufactures that produce high quantities of products, work is subdivided into as many tasks as
possible. Instead of having each worker engaged in the entire production of a chair from start to
finish, the workers are subjected to being responsible for a single operation (e.g. screwing in the
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arm rests). Smith praises this arrangement of labor, maintaining that “by reducing every man’s
business to some one simple operation, and by making this operation the sole employment of his
life,” you allow for the worker to develop an adeptness to the particular task.14 One of the
consequences of subjecting workers to this particular relation to labor is a fragmentary and
distorted understanding of what it means to create a useful object. Rather than having to learn
various skills and understand the construction of a chair in a relatively holistic manner, all the
worker is required to learn is a single bodily gesture. Georg Lukács describes something similar
in the following statement: “The process of labor is progressively broken down into abstract,
rational, specialized operations so that the worker loses contact with the finished product and his
work is reduced to the mechanical repetition of a specialized set of actions.”15 The “repetition of
a specialized set of actions'' does not constitute the ability to build a chair. The worker who is
forced to endure these conditions cannot say they know how to build a chair, for they only know
how to screw in arm rests. Recall the carpenter’s relation to creation described in the first
section: she was able to clearly recognize her abilities and creativity in the product of her labor.
And most importantly, her agency was being exercised in her production, which was expressed
in her resolve to expand her competence and creativity in building different types of chairs. This
relates to Marx’s contention that workers have been alienated from their “species-being,”
expounded in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. He states, “free conscious activity is the
species character of man”; which is to say that the essential feature that marks one out as human
is the fact that they are able to exercise agency.16 This unique quality, which should be held
sacrosanct, is diminished and constricted when someone other than the worker—the capitalist—
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owns the worker’s labor and its products. Learning how to utilize different tools and
understanding the variety of ways to connect different parts (dovetail joints, lap joints, etc) are
aspects of the creation process which are not fostered under the dominion of the mechanized
division of labor. Being denied the ability to express agency and cultivate artistry through
creation inevitably results in the worker viewing themselves as devoid of creativity and someone
who is incapable of spontaneous activity.
Another way in which advanced capitalism has warped the worker’s apprehension of
productive activity, and consequently of their sense of self, is by estranging the worker from
those who use the objects they produce. The products are not owned by the worker, so they are
not the one who exchanges them. As a consequence, the worker is not able to interact with the
consumers to ascertain how they evaluate the product (what aspects of the chair do they find
appealings, the flaws about the chair, etc). And as we explored in the second section,
communication with those who use the objects one creates plays a significant role in mastering
and developing one’s craft. Even when the customer finds a defect with the product, the
worker
is not the one they speak to in order to resolve the issue. The employer is typically the
one who is informed, as well as the one who expresses dissatisfaction towards the worker. And
when a worker is subjected to an intense division of labor, where their exclusive duty is a single
operation, they invariably feel no responsibility towards the product; for the worker fails to “see
himself in the world he made.”17 In industrial capitalism where large retailers purchase in mass
quantities, rather than individuals directly purchasing the products, the relationship between the
worker and the one who purchases the object they produce is even further removed. Moreover,
the rise of bureaucratic “red tape” found in corporation’s customer service adds a few inches in
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the separation between the consumer and the producer (the worker). One may raise the objection
that the rise of the internet has engendered numerous ways for individuals to find self-employed
work that is creative and meaningful; eBay, Etsy, and Artfire are a few examples of online
services that have opened up this employment space. While I am willing to concede that there is
hope in utilizing these services as a means for establishing meaningful labor, labor which allows
the worker to see themselves in the products, most of these services are limited in that they
primarily deal with artistic creations. Components of the economy such as food or vehicle
production would be difficult to incorporate in the small-scale production that takes place on
websites like Etsy or eBay. And while there seems to be hope with these web services, capitalist
countries are nevertheless experiencing an excessive decline of small businesses, and a
concurrent rise of large manufacturing monopolies (like Amazon, Walmart, Foxconn, etc).18
Consequently, with the prevalence of massive corporations comes a collective sense of
disaffection and powerlessness with regards to the individual’s relationship to labor.

Conclusion
There are many more facets of advanced capitalism which distort a worker’s
understanding of their productive activity, and thereby of their sense of self. Subjects such as
false consciousness and ideology play a role in contorting the definition of labor. Additionally,
the rise of bureaucratic vocations, or what David Graeber calls “bullshit jobs,” further muddles
the most fundamental properties of labor and creation.19 Any form of labor where the worker
cannot exercise agency, creativity, intelligence, etc, will find the activity to absorb and deplete
their subjectivity, rather than reflect it. This is one of the consequences of capitalism that I
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attempted to make explicit in the essay. My chief objective in this essay was to uncover an
essential property of productive activity; namely, its ability to reflect one’s subjectivity and
capabilities as human beings. Guided by the writings of Marx and Hegel, I expound upon this
characteristic in the first and second sections. The first illustrated how one’s unique human
capacities—creativity, intelligence, etc— can be expressed and cultivated primarily through
labor, the objective transformation of the world. The second section attempted to demonstrate
how the subjectivity reflected in one’s creation (or product) attains certainty only when that
creation is used by another. I contended in the last section that once there is a neglect of the
intimate interrelation between labor and human subjectivity, forms of labor that estrange and
disconnect workers from their creation (and thereby from their subjectivity) become socially
and politically permissible.
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Laughter as a Critical tool for Liberation
Jay Nelson
University of Texas, Dallas

The question of what society is and how it operates is one that has been analyzed
extensively in continental philosophy. In these analyses, the actions of the individual are taken as
products of the society. This frames the question of the quality of life of the individual in a
specific social context that restricts the possibility of critiques of the individual and their
ideological values within a broader critique of society. In other words, these thinkers endeavor to
improve the society by means of criticizing the practices of the social body instead of the
ideology of the individual. Gilles Deleuze, Simone Weil, and Herbert Marcuse together provide
us the tools to conduct an analysis of society in which the society and individual are viewed as
within a symbiotic relationship. In Pure Immanence, Deleuze details an interpretation of
Nietzsche’s will to power and criticizes how it had previously only been interpreted as
domineering rather than life-affirming. It is through this critique that Deleuze allows for the
possibility of a structural political analysis of social power as life-affirming rather than lifedenying. To approach an analysis of this critique, we must try to integrate a new understanding
of force and power that Deleuze offers with prior social structural criticisms while including its
individual component. This is why Simone Weil’s analysis of force in The Iliad or the Poem of
Force is a very fruitful addition to the literature on power and force. Because of her emphasis on
what the individual can do in the face of overwhelming force as she describes it, she also chooses
to discuss it in a context in which a systemic analysis of force is still possible. These particular
characteristics of Weil’s analysis of force allows us to use her work as an intermediary between
Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s power and Marcuse’s work in The One-Dimensional
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Man. Marcuse characterizes society as one which is subtly totalitarian through its illusion of free
choice in the capitalist framework of western society. He views this system as one which reduces
human life down to one dimension in both how we operate within our society and in how we
value things. This idea of one-dimensionality fits very well with Weil’s concept of force and
seems like the inevitable product of a society that has a life denying understanding of power.
This returns us to the question: Is a society with a positive relationship between power and life
possible? John Lippett’s work on laughter combined with this life-affirming understanding of
Force indicates to us that a life-affirming society is only possible through a return to a critical
mode of laughter.
Due to Deleuze’s masterful writing and his own unique philosophical perspective, it is
difficult to differentiate his explanations of the thinkers he is writing about versus his own
thoughts. In fact, in several instances he does both simultaneously. Despite the fact that the work
that is being referenced is an explanation of Nietzsche’s ideas, I am going to refer to the ideas
from the section about Nietzsche from Pure Immanence as if they come solely from Deleuze
unless differentiation seems appropriate in specific instances.
For Deleuze, to be life-affirming is fundamentally oriented around unity between life and
thought. “Life activates thought, and in turn thought affirms life” (Pure Immanence, 66).
Thought and philosophy must be responsive to and affirmative of life. The creation of
metaphysics birthed a disjunction in this unity by forcing thought to deny life by judging it
against ‘higher values’. This leads to philosophy and thought being reactive rather than active
which is the context that allows us to make sense of the will to power as domination. It is
through this reaction that the interpretation of phenomena and the creation of meaning lead to a
reactive relationship of forces. This places coercion as the primary force in the relationship of
forces that composes the will while adaptation and regulation become secondary forces. This is
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how the understanding of the will to power as domination came about that places reaction over
action. It is what we now intuitively conceive of when thinking of force or power. Deleuze wants
a return to this presocratic life-affirming way of thinking to change how we think of the will to
power which should be oriented around creation of values through the action-thought unity.
It is with this life-affirming understanding of force in mind that we must now turn to
Weil’s work on Force and attempt to adapt it to fit this creative mode of being. She characterizes
Force very generally as “that x that turns anybody subjected to it into a thing…[which] turns man
into a thing in the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him.” (Weil, 163). The example of
Force in action she chooses is the epic poem The Iliad by Homer, because it is incredibly honest
in its characterization of Force in that it never shies away from showing the reader Force in its
incredible brutality. One particular moment that Weil draws our attention to shows that Force, as
she describes at its most extreme, lethal force, is in fact not its most insidious form. Rather,
Force as the potential of enacting death is far more damaging to an individual because it turns the
body into a thing and entombs the mind/soul/spirit in the thingified body. Weil posits that the
mere threat of Force is sufficient to turn man into a thing, “[a] man stands disarmed and naked
with a weapon pointing at him; this person becomes a corpse before anybody or anything
touches him” (Weil, 165). This is the way that we see force at its smallest level which is lifedenying, in how it literally is tied to lethality. In addition to this it subjugates thought into a
reactive role by coercing all those participating in it to reject thought that has the possibility to
affirm their life. This is why Weil is so insistent that the solution to Force is short pauses of
reflection; just small moments in which thought can affirm life. However, because these pauses
can only occur momentarily, the reflection they enable one to have is consumed with the weight
of the experience of violent actions rather than true life-affirming thought in the Deleuzian sense.
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Beyond this smallest level of Force on an individual, there is also significance to the
central conflict of The Illiad being a war, which is a manmade product of the structures and
institutions of society. This shows how Force is not just a natural phenomenon, but rather is
something that is produced and perpetuated by specific structural interactions. In her review of
James Holoka’s new edition of The Illiad or The Poem of Force, Sheila Murnaghan mentions the
context in which it was written, “The Iliad, or The Poem of Force was written in the summer and
fall of 1940, after the fall of France. It may thus be read as an indirect commentary on that tragic
event, which signalized the triumph of the most extreme modern expression of force.”
(Murnaghan, 1). This context only adds to how we can understand Force through its extreme
expression in the military expansion of Nazi Germany. The Nazis in particular were influenced
by an incomplete interpretation of Nietzsche’s will to power as one of domination. This lifedenying will to power of domination is the quintessence of Weil’s force which is not just a
phenomenon but a specific political and structural context that perpetuates itself through
individual actors. This is why reflective pauses can only ever be discrete moments in the face of
all-powerful systems.
At this point, Marcuse’s work in The One-Dimensional Man fits nicely with this
connection between life-denying thought and Force on both individual and systemic levels.
Marcuse describes how the process of alienation and capitalist ideology has advanced so much as
to now fully encompass the individual even to the point of removing the inner freedom that one
experiences as a psychological subject though the psychoanalytic process of introjection. This
appears to be another version of the phenomenon Weil described in slaves, that the threat of
death reduces the scope of what the slave can experience down to the forced affection a slave
must exhibit for their master. “To lose more than the slave does is impossible, for he loses his
whole inner life. A fragment of it he may get back if he sees the hope of the possibility of
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changing his fate, but this is his only hope.” (Weil, 170) The quote above shows the
diminishment of the inner life and freedom of the slave. In addition, Marcuse would say that a
part of this introjection is the capitalist ideology and the immediate identification of the self with
the industrialized civilization of our society. This identification removes opposition to the norms
and practices of society which leads to,
...The loss of this [inner] dimension, in which the power of negative thinking... is at
home, is the ideological counterpart to the very material process in which advanced
industrial society silences and reconciles the opposition. (Marcuse, 11).
This death of the power of negative thinking is the most absolute version of the dominance of
life-denying thought. For, it is in this death that the ability to critique present values is lost and
thus the ability to create new values is as well. Deleuze mentions the three metamorphoses from
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra: the Camel, Lion, and Child. The Camel represents the
mode of life in which we merely bear the values of our present society. The Lion represents the
stage when we begin to critique and destroy the values imposed on us. And, the Child is the stage
in which the life-affirming practice of creating our own values takes place. Marcuse describes
perfectly how the present ideological values of our society are no longer able to be critiqued
which prevents the possibility of life activating thought and thought, in turn, affirming life. It is
due to the limitation of Force that we are not able to transition from the Camel to the Lion. This
is the final stage of Force: it has not just turned our bodies into things, but our souls as well.
There is no longer even the possibility of a life-affirming philosophy in our society anymore.
It is at this point that we must again consider how we might escape this predicament. It is
such a totalizing problem that we are unable to grasp a full picture of what it might tangibly
mean to live in a life-affirming society. This imaginative difficulty forces us to look to different
types of solutions within our social framework. It is here that we must turn to John Lippitt’s
work on laughter in a Nietzschean context. He says:
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Zarathustra's praise of laughter in his speech to the higher men is ecstatic. He urges them
to 'learn to laugh at yourselves as a man ought to laugh!'24 Contrasting himself with
Jesus, who in Luke 6:25 wishes 'woe to you who laugh now'. (“Nietzsche, Zarathustra
and the Status of Laughter”, 43)
Lippitt goes on to say,
Laughing lions, then, are what the higher men have to become in order to embrace the
eternal recurrence and laugh the laughter of the height. It is only when they do this, which
they indeed eventually do in an affirmation almost as ecstatic as Zarathustra's own, that
they realize their freedom… (“Nietzsche, Zarathustra and the Status of Laughter”, 43).
Lippitt here connects the idea behind Nietzsche’s character of Zarathustra, that of the Lion and
Child, with a very tangible practice of rejection of the life-denying attitude of Jesus from the
book of Luke. This second section from Lippitt almost comes out of Deleuze himself here:
“Eternal Return is not only selective thinking but also selective Being. Only affirmation comes
back, only what can be affirmed comes back, only joy returns.” (Deleuze, 88). Laughter itself is
the mechanism to return to a life-affirming philosophy and thus a life-affirming society. It is
through Laughter that we as people locked in the stage of the Camel can begin to shift to the
Lion which reintroduces the critical power of negative thinking that Marcuse thought was lost.
Laughter has been thought of for centuries as a force itself because it has been able to subvert the
dominating power structures of societies. It gives power to those who have none through its
critical faculty. It is itself a mode of freedom and becoming through these affirmative critical
qualities. In another work, Lippitt pointed out the almost religious role of Laughter for this same
reason, “It is the redemptive potential of laughter as an attitude towards ourselves and our world
that leads Nietzsche to condemn those who forbid us to laugh at ourselves, them, and human
existence. Note, therefore, that laughter is assigned a quasi-religious role” (“Existential
Laughter”, 2). Thus, it forges a way towards a new kind of society which is almost inconceivable
to us. In truth, it is difficult to even use the word “society” for what would require such a radical
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shift. Because our modern notion of society requires such social limitation, it even tries to
exercise force over the conditions of Laughter. Laughter has been commodified primarily
through the comic industry, which perverts its critical power into a passive experience. Thus in a
similar way that Weil and the critical theorists propose their modest solutions to cope with the
overwhelming force of their problems, I propose that we must take laughter seriously as a critical
mode of being and as a mode of political expression.
This raises the question: if Laughter can be commodified and integrated within this
oppressive system of force, then how can it be liberatory? The answer requires us to first define
what we mean by Laughter. Laughter as a phenomenon, is necessarily tied to what gave rise to it.
It is a responsive action. We have already seen previously that the phenomenon of laughter can
be commodified so, naturally, we are not talking about the phenomenon of laughter alone. What
we are discussing is the character and interpretation of the action that gives rise to laughter or put
simply: a joke or comedic situation. However, the purpose here is to use laughter as a critical
activity, thus we cannot just simply say a ‘joke’ because that would invoke the social values that
form the concept of ‘joke’ which we are attempting to criticize. In order to critically use laughter,
we must take as its object the values that society is attempting to impose upon us. This new
critical type of Laughter takes on an almost obscene character from the perspective of the values
it criticizes because these introjected social values effect our judgements of it. Thus, we, as
influenced subjects, are tasked with the creation of a product that we have to learn to appreciate.
It is very important to note that in this critical Laughter is the rejection of particular types of
values, life-denying values. Thus, laughter must reject any ‘guidance’ or direction from these
life-denying values of our society in order for it to be possible to critique them. In other words,
Laughter cannot only be obscene, it must also be totally holistic. It is here that a reference to
Camus appears appropriate to mention as this holistic critical Laughter appears much like his
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description of the rebellion against the Absurd. Both are a rejection of systems of meaning or
value placed upon us by others. Laughter becomes a method to reject the values of society that
have been impressed upon us as well as a method to embrace the arbitrary existential situation
we find ourselves within. Thus, while Laughter in this sense fits within the Camusian
framework. Its goal is to advance beyond rebellion against the Absurd into a more
Nietzschean/Deleuzian sense of life-affirmation.
Weil and Marcuse when read together are almost obviously in agreement and few would
take issue with their pairing. However, the introduction of Deleuze to the pair totally shifts the
emphasis of the critique and truly propels the force and severity of their arguments. Orienting
ourselves towards the goal of a life-affirming philosophy raises the stakes of the discussion
because the mechanisms that trap us in the immanence of a life-denying mode of thought operate
on a far deeper and more insidious level than the structural mechanisms of a capitalist society. In
this analysis, however, we see clearly that there is a path to unity between action and thought
through the practice of serious critical Laughter. This Laughter is a method by which we can
reintroduce critical capacities that these aforementioned structural mechanisms have removed
from us. This then allows us to question the life-denying values impressed upon us by our
society. It is through this critical mode of Laughter that we can begin to create our own lifeaffirming values and restore the unity between life and thought.
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On the Deconstruction of Metaphysics: Heidegger’s Critical Ontology in
Being and Time
Marshall Pierce
Portland State University
Abstract: Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time offers a sustained critique of the Western
philosophical tradition. Specifically, Heidegger describes his project as a “deconstruction” of
prior ontological systems, whose goal is a positive recuperation and reformulation of the
“question of being.” This question, Heidegger suggests, has been obscured and distorted by prior
metaphysics. In Division One of Being and Time, Heidegger explicates his own ontology in a
critical mode, positioning himself against various canonical figures while forging his own, novel
conception of the “being of beings.” This paper offers a focused exposition of Being and Time’s
first Division, tracing the contours of Heidegger’s critical project while shedding light on his
reading of the history of Western metaphysics. Centering on Heidegger’s critical intervention in
ontology, the paper shows how Heidegger’s unique vision emerged through a complex
engagement with Aristotelian and Cartesian thought.

Introduction
In a letter to Karl Löwith dated February 20, 1923, Martin Heidegger described the
conclusion of the seminar he had offered the previous year on the seminal work of his esteemed
mentor, Edmund Husserl: “In the final hour […], I publicly burned and destroyed the Ideas to
such an extent that I dare say the essential foundations for the whole [of my work] are now
cleanly laid out” (quoted in Kiesel and Sheehan, 2007, p. 372). Later remarking to the same
Löwith that this experience secured him “completely on [his] own feet,” Heidegger indicated the
extent to which his own philosophical journey was intimately entangled with a critical project
and posture: the “essential foundations” of the pupil’s work were “laid out” in precisely the same
moment that he “burned and destroyed” his master’s system (Ibid.). It should come as little
39

surprise, then, that with the publication of his magnum opus only four years later, Heidegger
would deliver a sustained and probing critique of Western metaphysics; he framed his whole
project in Being and Time as a “deconstruction,” or “destruction” (Destruktion) of prior
ontology, with an eye toward a positive reformulation of the “question of being” (Heidegger,
2010, p. 22). Heidegger’s metaphysics is delineated point by point in a critical or contrapuntal
mode,1 positioned against the work various canonical figures; it is by means of critique that
Heidegger forged his own, novel conception of the “being of beings” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 8).
The purpose of the present study is to draw out the critical dimension of Heidegger’s
approach in Being and Time’s first Division. Rather than offering a reconstruction of the entire
work, the study limits itself to an exposition of precisely those points at which Heidegger is
engaged—explicitly or otherwise—with the two figures who emerge as his privileged objects of
critique, namely Descartes and Aristotle. This study’s first objective—and the substance of its
first section—is to familiarize the reader with Aristotle’s and Descartes’s views insofar as they
form the background upon which Heidegger critically constructs Being and Time’s first Division.
The study’s second objective—and the matter of its second section—is to demonstrate the
substance of Heidegger’s critique and the positive aspects of his critical ontology. Heidegger
treats Aristotelian and Cartesian ontology as paradigms which more or less circumscribe all
subsequent ontological reflection; yet according to Heidegger, both Aristotle and Descartes
derived their metaphysics from a limited or shallow notion of being, mistakenly elevating one

1

In musicology, counterpoint describes a relationship between two or more musical lines which are
independent in rhythm and melodic contour, yet which remain harmonically interdependent. The
ambivalent independence of a contrapuntal line or voice captures nicely the relation between Heidegger’s
system and those he critiques: precisely insofar as his positive vision emerges through a gesture of
negation and an emphasis on difference, Heidegger’s work cannot be said to be fully independent of prior
metaphysics. As we shall see, there is a strong sense in which Heideggerian deconstruction builds, while
incorporating and preserving that which is negated.
40

particular sort of being to the level of a paradigm or archetype to which all beings should
correspond.

Prior Meanings of Being
Due to his sustained engagement with the history of Western metaphysics, an outline of
the prior meanings of being is requisite to an understanding of Heidegger’s critical project and a
sophisticated appreciation of his ontology. Indeed, the novelty and stakes of his metaphysics will
be lost on a reader unfamiliar with the tradition it calls to task. Heidegger works from the
supposition that Aristotelian and Cartesian thought circumscribe modern ontological reflection
and discourse—that is, it is nearly impossible to pose ontological questions without
incorporating Aristotelian or Cartesian assumptions. In order to pose the “question of being”
anew, Heidegger insists that we must think beyond—which is not to say wholly reject—Aristotle
and Descartes (Heidegger, 2010, p. 22). To do so, however, we must first familiarize ourselves
with their thought and their discourse. This section hence reconstructs Aristotelian and Cartesian
metaphysics, which appear as privileged objects of Heidegger’s critique in Being and Time’s first
Division.
At the most general level, one can discern two accounts of being in the Aristotelian
corpus—a substantialist account and a hylomorphic account. The former is developed in
Aristotle’s Categories; the latter is in the Physics. In the Categories—traditionally considered
the first work of the Organon2—Aristotle endeavored to discern the basic “categories” required
to think or talk about anything. He proposed ten such categories, which correspond more or less
That is, Aristotle’s collected works on logic, comprising six volumes. According to convention, the
order of the works, with the corresponding Bekker numbering, is as follows: Categories (1a), On
Interpretation (16a), Prior Analytics (24a), Posterior Analytics (71a), Topics (100a), On Sophistical
Refutations (164a).
2
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precisely to various parts of speech. The first category is substance (οὐσία), which Aristotle
distinguishes in its “primary” and “secondary” modes (Aristotle, 1991a, p. 4 [2a13-2a18]).
Primary substances are what we tend to think of as entities, or things—Aristotle gives the
example of an individual man or an individual horse—whereas secondary substances are types of
entities—Aristotle called them “species”—as distinct from entities themselves. “The species in
which the things primarily called substances are,” Aristotle writes, “are called secondary
substances, as also are the genera of these species. […] [T]he individual man belongs in a
species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are called
secondary substances” (Aristotle, 1991a, p. 4 [2a13-2a18], italics added). Both primary and
secondary substances possess being, according to Aristotle—both are real—and in either case
meaningful propositions can be formulated in which substance—whether primary or
secondary—occupies the subject position (Aristotle, 1991a, p. 6 [3b10-3b23]).
Aristotle suggested that quality or attribute (ποιότης) was another fundamental category
(Aristotle, 1991a, p. 15 [8b25-8b26]). Substances necessarily have attributes, and a thing without
attributes is hardly conceivable. For Aristotle, attributes possess being, as do substances—they
too are real—but the being of attributes is, in a certain sense, derivative of the being of
substance. Hardness is a real attribute of a desk, for instance, yet hardness in itself, bereft of a
substance in which it inheres, cannot be said to exist or take a share in being. A desk bereft of
hardness would surely be a lousy desk—perhaps it wouldn’t be a desk at all—yet as substance, it
would continue to be, and attributes other than hardness would necessarily inhere in it. Lending
ontological priority to substance, Aristotle implied a pluralistic ontology which would be
thematized in Heidegger; yet, as we shall see, the ontological priority accorded to substance
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came to exert a profound influence on the history of Western metaphysics—and this influence,
Heidegger believed, eclipsed and distorted our understanding of being.
Substantialism, the metaphysics of the Categories, was not Aristotle’s only contribution
to the history of Western ontology. The account of being most often associated with his name in
fact diverges from the one offered in this early volume. Aristotle expounded his later,
“hylomorphic” account of being in order to overcome an apparently intractable problem arising
within the simple, predicative relationship between substances and attributes which characterizes
substantialist metaphysics. Aristotle observed that existing things change, which is explicable in
terms of their attributes in a substantialist framework: change occurs when a substance
exchanges one attribute or set of attributes for another (Aristotle, 1991a, pp. 15, 16 [8b27-9a9,
9a29-9b9]). But things are also generated and destroyed, and as Aristotle saw clearly in his
Physics, genesis and destruction pose an aporia for substantialist ontology, in so far as being and
non-being can only be conceived as attributes within its terms (Aristotle, 1991b, pp. 80-81, 120
[225a1-225a19; 225a35-225a36; 245b9-246a9]). To say that non-being inheres as an attribute in
a thing is a paradox, and this unavoidable paradox led Aristotle to revise his account of being.
Hylomorphic ontology does not abandon the notion of substance, it qualifies it. Here,
substance is distinguished as matter (ὕλη) composed or arranged under a certain form (μορφή)
(Aristotle, 1991b, p. 23 [194b9]). Hylomorphic ontology transcends the aporia faced by
substantialist ontology by proposing that the material substrate which undergoes changes such as
genesis and destruction is not substance but matter, and the thing lost or gained is not attribute
but form (Aristotle, 1991b, p. 13 [190a9-190a31]). When substance—a complex, articulated
thing composed of form and matter—is destroyed, it undergoes a process of decomposition
whereby the matter remains but the form is effaced. Because matter is not itself substance, this
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account reconciles substantialist ontology with our lived experience, an experience in which
entities indeed go out of and come into existence.
Up to this point, one could have said that the preeminent meaning of being in Aristotle is
substance. Yet with the advent of the hylomorphic account, substances come into being by virtue
of the formal composition of matter, and the concept of form thus achieves a sort of priority in
Aristotle’s later metaphysics. What it is for a thing to be a substance is to be a substance
endowed with a form, and when a substance loses its form it loses its existence qua substance. If
my desk is destroyed in a fire, its being is lost due to the absolute elimination of its formal
properties—it is reduced to ashes. Yet precisely these ashes demonstrate that matter persists,
under a different form, even when substance is destroyed. In Book II of the Physics, Aristotle
links the form of a thing to its function; many things, he observes, assume the forms they do to
perform a given task. (Aristotle, 1991b, p. 23 [194b27-194b29]). Consider a desk, or a bodily
organ: each of these has a physical composition tightly linked to what it does. Both form and
function are in this way linked by Aristotle to a thing’s purpose (τέλος), i.e., what a thing is for
or that for the sake of which it has the form that it does. If a desk was for digging, rather than
sitting behind, it would surely have a different form; and if a heart was for gastrointestinal
digestion rather than pulmonary circulation, it too would have a different physical composition.
While Aristotle’s reasoning may seem exact—and it surely holds in certain cases—the
limitations of hylomorphism as a metaphysical position are significant. Due to the imbrication of
the concepts outlined above—form, function, and purpose (τέλος)—one must conclude that
hylomorphism is, at bottom, a metaphysics of the functional object. Put differently, Aristotle
failed to consider that things worthy of metaphysical description may exist that for all that lack
functions or purposes. Because on his view all material beings are substances in which form
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(μορφή) and purpose (τέλος) are tightly linked with being itelf, Aristotle was forced to consider
human beings, like all things, as entities endowed with a final purpose—which he defined in the
Nichomachean Ethics as εὐδαιμονία, or human flourishing according to the good (Aristotle,
2000, p. 5 [1095a]). Taking a certain sort of thing—functional things—as a paradigm of being
itself, Aristotle was incapable of properly analyzing the ontological structure of things without
τέλη, or purposes.
* * *
Alongside Aristotle, René Descartes stands as a key object of Heidegger’s critique in
Division One of Being and Time. In the ontology developed across his Discourse on Method,
Meditations on First Philosophy, and Principles of Philosophy, Descartes drew heavily on the
views of the early Aristotle, or a substantialism in which entities primarily figure as bearers of
attributes. Significantly, Descartes would adapt Aristotle’s typology of attributes—developed in
the Categories—to make a novel distinction between “principle” and “dependent” attributes of
things; the first was a constitutive feature of a thing, where the second was merely accidental.
The notion of a “principle attribute” led Descartes to posit a categorical distinction between two
classes things—res cogitans and res extensa, or mental and extended substances. The principle
attribute of the first is thought; of the second, corporality (Descartes 2003, p. 98). In this way, the
schema of Aristotelian substantialism, in which the world is composed of many classes of being,
would be dramatically reduced by Descartes to two: the ideal and the material, which are, with
regard to one another, wholly discrete. “Examining what we are,” Descartes wrote, “we clearly
perceive that neither extension, nor figure, nor existence in any place […] nor anything similar
that can be attributed to body, pertains to our nature, and nothing save thought alone” (Descartes,
2003, p. 59, see also p. 98). Cartesian dualism thus hypostatized a rigid divide between subjects
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and objects: the objective world of res extensa became ontologically distinct from the ‘I’ of
mental substance, while all thought, sensation, and experience was conceived in terms of
attributes inhering in the cogitating ‘I.’
Following the division between principal and dependent attributes, Descartes would
introduce a further distinction, marking off those attributes which could be described by
euclidian geometry—conceived in terms of abstract extension—from those which are grounded
in sense perception. “Extension in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal
substance,” Descartes wrote, here affirming that the world of bodily objects is, ipso facto, an
abstract domain of calculable space. As a rationalist, Descartes held up geometrical knowledge
as an epistemological ideal:
[Having examined] all the clear and distinct notions of material things that are to be found in
our understanding, and […], finding no others except those of figures, magnitudes, and
motions, and of the rules according to which these three things can be diversified by each
other, which rules are the principles of geometry and mechanics, I judged that all the
knowledge man can have of nature must of necessity be drawn from this source; because all
the other notions we have of sensible things, as confused and obscure, can be of no avail in
affording us the knowledge of anything out[side] of ourselves, but must serve rather to
impede it (Descartes, 2003, p. 177, italics added).
Descartes categorically transposed attributes grounded in sense perception—such as taste and
smell, as well as value and meaning—into the domain of the subject. According to this view,
such qualities do not describe the world as res extensa, but are mere attributes inhering in mental
substance, or abstract subjectivity.3
The substantialist metaphysics of Descartes roots itself in a rejection of Aristotelian
hylomorphism—one following from the preeminent position held by the concept of function in

3

Significantly, precedent for such a distinction can be found in Aristotle himself, who, in the Categories,
distinguished among qualities to isolate those “affective” qualities—such as color—which follow not
from an “affectation” in or of the substance in question, but instead affect our sensory perception of that
substance. See Aristotle, 1991a, p. 16 [9b10-9b19].
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Aristotle’s mature thought. Emerging at the threshold of modernity from a medieval Scholastic
tradition where function was tightly linked to the idea of ascription, Descartes tended to view
things in themselves as functionless. Where function was naturalized in Aristotle, it was typical
of the New Science championed by Descartes to view function as conceivable only in terms of
subjective or divine attribution: without an ascribing subject, all things were without purpose
and, therefor, intrinsically functionless (Smith, 2018). To the extent that the function of a thing
could be said to take a share in being, this was purely a mental phenomenon—like taste, smell, or
meaning—imprisoned in the formless void of the cogitating ‘I.’
Descartes’ claim that geometrical description amounts to the most indubitable—and
hence fundamental—way of apprehending or describing the world was profoundly disconcerting
to Heidegger. Does this not represent a cold, mathematizing interpretation of being? Here, no
thing can be said to be said to bear objective significance, since meaning is categorically
excluded from the mathematical or natural scientific level of description (Heidegger, 2010, pp.
88-89). On the other hand, Aristotle’s mature ontology was grasped by Heidegger as a
metaphysics in which the functional object was falsely privileged as a paradigm for all things—
and ultimately for being itself. In Heidegger’s estimation, then, the horizon of Western
metaphysics presents itself in a janus-faced aspect: within this tradition, the meaning of being
has been systematically distorted and violently reduced—to the teleological being of the
functional object or the abstract and vacuous being of substance.

Toward a Fundamental Ontology
It is against the backdrop of these two tendencies—Aristotelian hylomorphism on the one
hand and Cartesian substantialism on the other—that Heidegger develops his “fundamental
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ontology” in Being and Time (Heidegger, 2010, p. 13). According to Heidegger, Aristotle had
mistakenly linked function, and hence purpose, to being as such; yet in Heidegger’s view neither
function nor τέλος can be necessary conditions of being, since human beings—the very beings
for whom being is a consideration—lack functions or purposes.4 On the other hand, the thrust of
Cartesian ontology divests corporeal existence of significance, making meaning utterly
subjective and the world a kind of cold, calculable waste. This perspective, Heidegger suggests,
fails to accord with the constitutive and intersubjective character of meaning as encountered in
the world, and diverges in the most radical ways from the horizon of actual experience. Both
Aristotelian and Cartesian ontology eclipse our view of being.
Division One of Being and Time elaborates a “fundamental ontology” which charts a
decidedly different trajectory than that traced by prior metaphysics. Employing a novel method
of phenomenological description, Heidegger arrives at an entirely new breed of metaphysics—
one he believes to be critically positioned vis-à-vis the ontological systems handed down by the
Western philosophical tradition. As a phenomenologist, Heidegger distances himself from prior
metaphysics in his insistence on the necessity of describing everyday experience, or “average
everydayness” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 16). As Thomas Kalary observes, Heidegger’s
phenomenological approach grounds “philosophy as a pre-theoretical primordial science” which
can be “enacted only through an explication” of the basic structures of “factic life” (faktische

Heidegger’s polemical claim that human beings are essentially purposeless should not be conflated with
a nihilistic one, whereby individual human life cannot be lived with intention and meaning. On the
contrary, Division Two of Being and Time explicates Heidegger’s normative guidelines for “authentic”
existence within the strictures of factical human life. Heidegger’s point here, in Division One, is that the
human being—or, more specifically, Dasein—lacks any generic purpose simply on the basis of its
inclusion in the category of being to which it belongs. Where a potter’s wheel has a specified purpose
simply by virtue of its being a potter’s wheel—and arguably, the same could be said to hold for an
uninvented thing, like a tree’s leaves or a red blood cell—a human being, qua human being, is neither
functional nor purposive.
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Leben) (Kalary, 2012, p. 181). Whereas Descartes’s meditative method rested upon his ability to
divorce himself from the world of the everyday, Heidegger emphasizes the centrality of that
world to any account of being as such. This is not to say that everything to be known about being
is immediately grasped in a pre-reflexive manner, for as Heidegger notes, fundamental ontology
as revealed by phenomenological inquiry is “far removed from what is accessible to the preontological understanding of being” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 177). Still, it is Heidegger’s view that
an accurate description of the constitutive structures of everyday experience will furnish an
ontology of the being whose everyday experience is so described. The overarching thrust of
Being and Time is to arrive at this descriptive account.
The everyday experience Heidegger undertakes to define in Being and Time unfolds from
the perspective of a being Heidegger calls Dasein. A common German noun often translated as
“existence,” the term composes the noun Sein, “being,” and the prefix da-, signifying “there.”
The type of being uncovered by Heideggerian fundamental ontology is thus not abstract but
concrete, always situated in a particular locus, or “world.”5 Due to the technical specificity with
which Heidegger invests the term Dasein, recent translators of his work tend to leave it
untranslated; and, because the whole of Division One of Being and Time can be seen as offering
a sustained, probing, and idiosyncratic definition of the term, one can hardly adduce a
comprehensive, sloganistic definition. Provisionally, though, one can say with confidence that
Dasein refers to the sort or the way of being that human beings fundamentally partake in or
have, though it is by no means explicit that Dasein is restricted to human beings.6

5

It is significant that, terminologically, this locus is undivided from the very being (Sein) fundamental
ontology describes. As we shall see, it is absolutely central to Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein that this
genre of being is wholly inseparable from the world in which it is given. This is in sharp contrast to the
Cartesian view, cited above, that mental substances are essentially non-spatial.
6
Heidegger offers somewhat equivocal remarks regarding the extent to which creatures other than
humans could be ontologically embraced by Dasein. In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” an essay
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Undertaking a fundamental ontology from the standpoint of Dasein, Heidegger commits
himself to an ontological pluralism, distinguishing Dasein from “other beings” which have
features other than those constitutive of Dasein (Heidegger, 2010, p. 11). This heterogeneity of
being raises two immediate concerns. First, if Heidegger wants to pose the “question of being”
sans phrase, as he claims, why does he take a particular sort of being, Dasein, as his starting
point? To justify this choice, Heidegger makes two distinct claims. First, he observes that Dasein
is that which is “ontically ‘nearest’” to us (Heidegger, 2010, p. 16). As the sort of being that we
ourselves are or have, Dasein is the genre of being with which we are most intimately familiar,
and hence the one we have the best shot at describing accurately. Ultimately, this claim rests on
Heidegger’s conviction that fundamental ontology will be revealed through phenomenological
description, a procedure of self-disclosure which cannot be performed for a being other than the
one we ourselves are. Secondly, Heidegger claims that Dasein is a being “essentially concerned
about its being,” for whom a “pre-ontological understanding of being” is an “essential tendency”
(Heidegger, 2010, pp. 11 and 13). As beings fundamentally predisposed to ontological reflection,
and always already endowed with a working definition of being, Dasein is, as it were, given to us
as a foundation for ontological inquiry.7

published in 1950 but drafted between 1937 and 1939, a decade after the initial publication of Being and
Time, Heidegger describes both plants an animals as existing with “no world.” (“World,” as we shall see,
is perhaps the most fundamental structure of Dasein according to the analysis of Being and Time.) By
contrast, in a series of lectures delivered in 1929, Heidegger describes non-human animals as “poor in
world” or existing within a fundamental “poverty of world” (Weltarmut). See Heidegger, 1971, p. 43;
Heidegger, 1995, p. 263. See also Agamben, 2004, pp. 49-73.
7
While Heidegger is right that these constitute excellent reasons to undertake a philosophical
investigation of Dasein, a profound unclarity persists concerning the way a fundamental ontology of this
particular sort of being is to furnish an answer to the “question of being” as such. In works subsequent to
Being and Time, such as the lecture series The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger will
argue that it is only to Dasein that being is revealed or “disclosed” as such. Whereas non-human animals
encounter the objects in their environments as pure particulars, Heidegger argues that only human beings
discover in such particulars the instantiation of being (Sein) itself, or encounter these particulars as
beings. (This claim dovetails with Heidegger’s assertion, in the same lectures, that non-human animals
are fundamentally “poor in world”; see footnote 7, above). Yet, even if Dasein is the being to whom
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If other ways or sorts of being are fundamentally heterogenous with respect to Dasein, as
Heidegger claims, one could raise a second objection: Does Heidegger not lapse into the same
genre of dualism for which he rebukes Descartes? Does he simply posit a new sort of subject
indelibly cleaved off from its object? Answering this question takes us to the heart of the
Heideggerian analysis of Dasein, and demonstrates the depth of Heidegger’s critical divergence
from Descartes. Heideggerian pluralism parts ways with the Cartesian division between res
cogitans and res extensa, for where Descartes finds mental substances radically distinct from res
extensa—and hence, inevitably skeptical as regards the latter—Heidegger presents Dasein as
always already “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 53). The world in which Dasein finds
itself is is not ontologically distinct from, but is rather a constitutive ontological structure of
Dasein. Always already known to Dasein, or familiar, the world forms an essential element in
the ontological explication of Dasein as a unique sort or way of being. Dasein, for this reason, is
never given apart from the world, and cannot be known except in and through its imbrication
with all things worldly (Heidegger, 2010, pp. 59-62). If Dasein is, in the most fundamental
sense, constituted in and through the world in which it is given, this represents a view of being at
antipodes with the model of Cartesian dualism.
Embedded in its world, Dasein is a being essentially “concerned” with things—objects
and practical engagements (Heidegger, 2010, p. 96). Far from being an immaterial spectator of
its material environment, Dasein is fundamentally involved in and engaged with the things
around it. The world is made up of objects Dasein touches, employs, and knows, and these
objects are certainly not best described geometrically, as mere “objectively-present” entities

being itself is fundamentally revealed, as Heidegger suggests, this hardly furnishes us with a bridge
between the fundamental ontology of Dasein and a fundamental ontology without qualification. See
Heidegger, 1995, p. 263.
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bereft of meaning (Vorhandene) (Heidegger, 2010, p. 96). On the contrary, the world
encountered by Dasein is a world invested with significance, a world comprised of vast networks
of meaningful things “ready-to-hand” (Zuhandene) (Heidegger, 2010, p. 67). Emphasizing the
everyday and the tactile, Heidegger notes that “the closest kind of dealing is not mere perceptual
cognition,” as Descartes would have it, but is rather “a handling, using, and taking care”
(Heidegger, 2010, p. 67). In other words, Dasein’s most basic or fundamental reality is surely not
skeptical, or even speculative, but is rather rooted in pre-philosophical, pragmatic encounters
with things in the world. Cartesian skepticism concerning the “demonstrability of the external
world” is unintelligible from the standpoint of an investigation which presupposes being-in-theworld and average everydayness as its foundation (Heidegger, 2010, pp. 77-83, cf. 195).
By emphasizing the practical, the everyday, and the worldly, Heidegger shows that the
Cartesian interpretation of the world as res extensa is not false, but is wholly derivative of a more
fundamental or “primordial” experience of the world—which is always pragmatically
encountered and invested with meaning. Dasein as being-in-the-world is, at the most
fundamental level, being in a meaningful environment made up of useful objects. Only on the
basis of such a world—which is always already “disclosed” or accessible in itself to Dasein in
the latter’s pragmatic and meaningful dealings—can a scientistic view of things as mere
objective presence (Vorhandenheit) arise (Heidegger, 2010, p. 195). In this way, Heidegger does
not so much reject Cartesian ontology as bracket and reverse it. Where Descartes takes the
mathematically describable character of res extensa to be the an objective bedrock against which
subjective experience and meaning-generation emerge, Heidegger sees this scientistic view as a
narrow, parochial description of things which can only be produced on the basis of a more
primordial experience of being-in-the-world. “Da-sein,” Heidegger writes, “is primordially
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familiar with that within which it understands itself […]. This familiarity with the world does not
necessarily require a theoretical transparency of the relations constituting the world as world. But
it is probable that the possibility of an explicit ontological […] interpretation of these relations is
grounded in the familiarity of the world constitutive for Da-sein” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 81). The
primordial condition of Dasein’s being-in-the-world is the real foundation upon which
theoretical or philosophical insights may be built.
Following Aristotle, Heidegger’s analysis of “world” (Welt) and the “handiness”
(Zuhandenheit) of things underscores the importance of functional and purposive objects to
ontological inquiry. Yet Dasein is not itself reducible to description in terms of function or
τέλος, since Heidegger, like Descartes, sees the functions of things as dependent upon Dasein.
However, for Heidegger, contra Descartes, ascriptions of function and meaning are not
individual subjective acts. Rather, they are collectively generated and sustained in socio-cultural,
historical, and pragmatic practices to which Dasein, as a “factical” being, is always already given
over: the world in which Dasein finds itself is one where meanings and purposes for things have
always already been established (Heidegger, 2010, p. 61). The desk at which I am writing isn’t
for sitting at rather than for digging a trench simply because I decide this. Rather, I encounter the
desk as a place for sitting; this is, after all, what the desk is. As indubitable features of sociocultural reality, meanings and purposes for things are objective features of the world, on
Heidegger’s view. That the avant garde artist may display a urinal as a work of art, excerpting it
from its functional mode of being and assigning it a new purpose and meaning from whole cloth
is no exception. On the contrary, the jarring and confounding presence of this object in a gallery,
and the scandal its presence provokes, serve to underscore Heidegger’s point: the meanings of
objects are so deeply socially codified—are indeed objective features of the social world—that
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any attempt to change these meanings may appear as a sort of violence directed at the social
order.8
While Heidegger’s stance vis-à-vis Cartesian thought is often polemical, his critical
engagement with—and appropriation of—Aristotle is significantly more nuanced. Of
Heidegger’s indebtedness to Aristotle, Martin Wheeler writes, “Aristotle’s demand in the
Metaphysics to know what it is that unites all possible modes of Being […] is, in many ways, the
question that ignites and drives Heidegger’s philosophy,” while Thomas Sheehan observes that
“Aristotle appears directly or indirectly on virtually every page” of Being and Time (Wheeler,
2011; Sheehan, 1975, p. 87). Heidegger engaged extensively with Aristotle, lecturing on
Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle in 1921-22, on the Basic Concepts of Aristotelian
Philosophy in 1924, and on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Θ1-3 in 1931; across these lectures,
Heidegger clarified his own philosophical vision via an extended dialogue with Aristotelian
thought.
Notwithstanding the complexity of this intellectual engagement, many of the criticisms
Heidegger explicitly addresses to Cartesian substantialism apply, tacitly, to Aristotle’s
hylomorphic metaphysics. As we have seen, Heidegger, like Aristotle, brings purposive and
functional objects to the foreground of his analysis, yet he distances himself from Aristotle by
rejecting the view that the being of the functional object can act as an archetype for being as
such. At a more profound level, Aristotle’s entire approach to metaphysics diverges sharply from
Heidegger’s, precisely due to the latter’s commitment to fundamental ontology as
phenomenological explication of Dasein’s everyday being-in-the-world. By contrast, Aristotelian
hylomorphic ontology is, precisely, a metaphysical theory: it deduces objects which are never
This example gestures towards the culturally conservative politics tacitly lurking beneath Heidegger’s
account of being and world. See Rosner, 2009.
8
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perceived or experienced in isolation—matter and form—from our real experiences of things,
specifically things which are generated and destroyed. Heideggerian fundamental ontology, on
the other hand, offers a clarification or elucidation of the basic pre-theoretical structures of being
as Dasein. In the same manner than Cartesian skepticism and a calculating comportment towards
existence can only arise on the basis of a more fundamental experience of “being-in-the-world,”
Aristotelian hylomorphism presupposes a more basic experience as its condition of possibility,
but this experience remains unthought within its parameters.
This experience and its basic structures emerged as Heidegger’s central objects of inquiry
in Being and Time. Situated at a deeper level than that charted by either Aristotle or Descartes—
a level prior metaphysics overlooked due to its quotidian character—Heidegger’s analytic of
Dasein is, strictly speaking, a fundamental ontology.

Conclusion
On Heidegger’s view, both Aristotle and Descartes used the wrong sort of model as the basis for
their ontology. For Descartes, mental substances exist completely divorced from a world made
up of objectively present things (Vorhandene), despite all phenomenological evidence to the
contrary. And for Aristotle, human beings are not essentially different from other entities, and
can thus be defined in terms of τέλος, or purpose. For both figures, metaphysics should properly
go beyond quotidian experience—furnishing an ontological theory of the latter—yet in this
gesture, metaphysics fails to interrogate its own conditions of possibility. Describing Dasein by
means of a phenomenology of the everyday, Heidegger hoped to avoid this error handed down
by the history of Western metaphysics: such was the project of fundamental ontology, which
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Heidegger also regarded as a “destruction” (Destruktion) of the Western metaphysical tradition
(Heidegger, 2010, p. 37).
Being and Time’s first Division unearths a pluralistic ontology in which Dasein shows up
as one entity among many. No single ontological description can encompass all things, in
Heidegger’s view, and the history of Western ontology has done violence to this simple fact. Yet
Heidegger does not simply reject prior ontological systems. His complex engagement with the
Western philosophical canon discloses how and why prior ontologists failed, and suggests that a
comprehensive ontology would make ample use of their insights. Aristotle’s hylomorphic
account of functional objects informs Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s practical dealings with
objects; and Heidegger accepts—perhaps begrudgingly—that a scientistic outlook indebted to
Descartes cannot be written off as simply wrong. Both of these interpretations of being find a
place in Heidegger’s structural analysis of Dasein; but they are both, at bottom, derivative of
Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
By formulating a fundamental ontology centering a particular being—Dasein—it is
ultimately unclear if Heidegger succeeds in transcending the deadlocks of prior metaphysics:
shadows of androcentrism and post-Kantian idealism linger at the margins of Heidegger’s
thought and his discourse. Even if Dasein is the being to whom being as such is revealed, as
Heidegger claims, he fails to specify how one can move from the ontological analysis of Dasein
to an investigation of being as such. If such a movement is somehow foreclosed to Dasein, one
could rightly ask, why? And if Dasein is the being who encounters being in beings, as Heidegger
insists, what form and content would an analytic of being as such assume? If these question
remain unanswered in his discourse, then perhaps Heidegger is finally right to suggest that
fundamental ontology illuminates the question—but not the answer—of the meaning of being
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(Heidegger, 2010, p. 37). Heidegger’s critical comportment toward canonical thought and the
project of prior ontology urges us to pose, again, that question.
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Palouse Prairie: Ethics Behind the Loss of an Ecosystem
Hailey V. Smith
Washington State University

Abstract: There is an ethical tradeoff between growing high-yield agricultural products and the
integrity and goodness of an ecosystem. Why must we protect an ecosystem and prevent
extinction of other organisms? One might claim that the human benefit gained from
environmental destructions for the purpose of agriculture is more valuable than any life or
structure that existed in the ecosystem. In the case of the Palouse Prairie in Eastern Washington,
early white settlers in the area valued the monetary gains from agriculture more than any
goodness of an intact ecosystem. Unlike the benefits gained from farming (which could be
attained through more sustainable means), what is lost with the destruction of an ecosystem or
the extinction of a species can never be restored. I will argue that humans are morally obligated
to not destroy living lineages when altering a landscape. A brief case study of the Palouse Prairie
will illustrate that the small-scale, land-altering decisions made by the few farmers of the Palouse
have caused long-term harms for the current and future inhabitants of the ecosystem, and that
humans ought to make reparations for those harms. Because evolution grants the potential for
any lineage to advance and better its individuals, the processes of evolution must be respected in
any ecosystem. Any lineage’s process of perpetuation must be morally considerable, as is any
living organism’s will to live. To offer a practical guideline for land alteration, I conclude with
the suggestion that all lineages of life receive freedom of environment, perpetuity, and
adaptation.

Palouse Prairie: Ethics Behind the Loss of an Ecosystem
Agriculture allows human populations to grow exponentially but that comes at a cost as
the former ecosystem perishes, and the surrounding land suffers – yet all of this killing has been
justified by humanity’s need to feed its growing population. In the case of agriculture, whether or
not a destructive farming practice is necessary for human survival does not change the ethical
impact of the consequential loss. In both cases of necessity and non-necessity, some thought
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must be given to the ethical impact of that loss which goes beyond the benefits that wild
ecosystems, or destruction of wild ecosystems, might supply to humans.
The Palouse Prairie grassland ecosystem in eastern Washington State is critically
endangered, with less than 1% of the prairie remaining. The main causes of destruction include
overgrazing of range animals, change in fire regime, new species introduction, and agriculture
(Sims & Risser, 1988). Now an anthropogenic landscape, the Palouse consists of rolling hills
covered in farmland. Could it be unwise to criticize a practice that once brought economic
growth to a region and provided food for a growing population? In times like these, when only
5% of land on Earth has escaped human modification (Kennedy et al., 2019) the criticism is
necessary. Any practice that modifies a landscape must be criticized ethically and not simply in
terms of human survival.

Case Study: Palouse Prairie
The Palouse Prairie is characterized as having a variety of bunchgrasses and forbs
growing in rich loess soils, with scatterings of drought-tolerant trees, scarce wetlands, and
forested areas on shady northern aspects. Native plants such as Idaho fescue and bluebunch
wheatgrass were common (Black et al., 1997; Sims & Risser, 1988). Today, 99.9% of what used
to be the prairie ecosystem has been destroyed (National Biological Service, 1995). The Palouse,
like so many other prairies that once were common in the United States, once supported endemic
native and endangered life.
The story of humans on the Palouse Prairie begins with the Nimi’ipuu, or Nez Perce
people, who occupied the Palouse region for hundreds of years before the arrival of Europeans.
The Nez Perce would use frequent fire burning to aid with plant regeneration, deer driving, seed
harvesting and animal forage (Boyd, 1999; Carroll et al., 2010). Frequent fires have significant
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impact on ecosystems, and from this history it must be concluded that the Palouse Prairie was
managed and influenced significantly by humans before the arrival of Europeans. The
Nez Perce’s land use demonstrates how humans can alter the ecosystem for their own benefit
without causing long-term damage, and also that successful human development does not
necessarily come at the cost of an entire ecosystem.
The arrival of white settlers eventually pushed the Nez Perce off of the prairie and onto
reservations, causing a marked shift in the way the prairie was managed (Black et al., 1997).
Between the 1870’s and the 1990’s, nearly the entire Palouse was transformed from prairie to
farmland (Black et al., 1997). What was considered innovation at the time gave the illusion that
the conversion of wild prairie into high intensity farmland was an act of human resilience. Yet, in
reality the settlers were causing larger, long-term problems for the ecosystem as a whole. As
Kyle Whyte wrote, resilience isn’t defined only in terms of human endurance, but rather as the
development of moral relationships between humans and the changing ecosystems in which we
reside (Whyte, 2018). As the white settlers forced the Nez Perce from their homes, they also
forced humanity away from its positive role in a diverse, resilient ecosystem. Today, the few
remnants of the ecosystem are so fragmented that there is little hope for restoration of the onceflourishing prairie.
This change in land management demonstrates that a few individual landowners making
decisions on private property can cause the destruction of an entire ecosystem. As Aldo Leopold
argued, a farmer’s actions on their land affect the entire community, but the farmer is more likely
to choose the profit-maximizing option with demonstrable short-term benefits, rather than the
long-term benefits for the whole (Leopold, 1949). These profit-driven actions might not have
been considered unethical at the time of the destruction of the Palouse Prairie, but as we move
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towards a more resilient world, we must analyze the decisions which led to such destruction and
seek not to take the same path.

What was Lost
The destruction of the Palouse Prairie caused the loss of tangible ecosystem benefits that
could potentially be restored, such as soil biodiversity, water quality, animal and plant
populations, critical habitat, and much more. Those qualitative and quantitative aspects of what
were lost have been explained in scientific studies (such as Brown et al., 2008; Pimentel et al.,
1995; Potts et al., 2020; USDA, 1978, 1979), and although they are important and relevant to all
that has been lost, in this paper I will focus on the intangible. This section will address the
nuances of lineages and absolute loss.
Lineage is a perpetual string of life formed by the passing of genetic information between
generations of living organisms. Lineage does not represent a single point in time, for it is the
history (as well as present and potential future) of all genetic information that has been passed
over time. Nor does lineage have a single identity; it is constantly changed over time through
genetic variations and thus cannot be represented as a single static entity (even self-cloning fungi
have evolved over time). Lineage is not one single genotype; it is the accumulation of about 3.5
billion years of life and death that have contributed to all living genotypes and created the
diversity of life on Earth.
Moral theorist Paul Taylor suggested that we grant moral standing to any being which has
a good of its own, raising the idea that living organisms have their own end towards which they
advance, and reaching that end implies the organism has led a good life (Taylor, 2011). I will
argue that this moral theory ought to be applied not only to living beings which seek an end, but
to the lineage which drives that innate pursuance of an end in all living organisms – lineage
which ties all life together on Earth. Lineage is life’s call to purpose, whether purpose exists or
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not in the sequential stages of evolution which have led to complex life. Because evolution has
directed single-celled organisms toward complex, intelligent and sentient life, the highly
controversial question must be addressed: does evolution have a purpose, and must that purpose
be preserved? It can be deduced from the theories of evolution and natural selection that there is
no end or purpose in evolution. Evolution and adaptation happen based on random mutations –
some of which are ‘selected’ based on environmental pressures to an organism. Beneficial
adaptations are not chosen, but rather won by those organisms who happen to have beneficial
mutations and produce more offspring. It can be argued that evolution has not a purpose, but a
consequential progression in which some organisms can become better-suited for their
environments. Evolution grants a potentiality for better life for all organisms, through adaptation
driven by natural selection. Note that evolution does not guarantee a better life but does grant a
potential.
Returning to Taylor’s theory, while organisms which seek an end are considered morally
relevant, I argue that it is difficult to define – if it exists – a common end towards which all
organisms purposefully advance. Humans do not have a common end. We share no overarching
expectation for ourselves, especially when comparing human lives from different cultures, times,
and locations. There is no evident end towards which we all are driven, but it is apparent that the
process which leads us to pursue an end is more valuable, and more tangible, than the end itself.
Biologically, our bodies and genetics are framed around reproduction, which translates to the
passing of the lineage to the next generation. Perpetuation through time is integral to the process
of all life, and evolution. Whether or not this perpetuation leads to an end is irrelevant to the
moral relevance of the life or to the moral relevance of evolution; but because the innate call of
all organisms is to perpetuate, it must be determined that this perpetuation has some moral
relevance, much like the moral relevance given by Taylor to all organisms which advance
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towards an end. Perpetuation, in this sense, does not mean basic reproduction, but it means the
continuance and evolution of one’s own species and all larger classifications: it is the
continuance of all life. This is not to be mistaken for a ‘pro-life’ argument in which every
individual human life must be preserved. It is an argument for the continuance of species and life
as a whole.
A lineage does not end with one organism’s death. The lineage ends with a larger group
that carries similar adapted traits that are not found in other groups, such as those traits defined in
the taxonomic classifications from species to domain. Because all life is theorized to have
emerged from one common ancestor, each individual life form carries its own path that can be
traced directly back to the common ancestor. A group of these individuals together as a species,
who share near-identical traits, carry a unique lineage. When one of these branches carrying
biological knowledge of the entire species is erased, there is absolute loss of lineage.
If the lineage of the eukaryotic branch in the phylogenetic tree of life had been terminated
by an extinction of the last eukaryotic common ancestor, which was a single-celled organism,
almost all forms of complex life that exist today would not have evolved. This is an example of
the potential of lineage. At any given point in time, a species must not be judged to be
insignificant based on perceived inferiority or lack of complexity. Like the single-celled
organisms that evolved into all of life as we know it on Earth, each lineage holds great potential.
An extinction, or absolute loss, happens when the genetic information is no longer passed
on through a lineage. Thus, a common ancestor which speciates (branches) into two different
species arguably does not go extinct, because its lineage is still continuous (Mclennan, 2010).
We can imagine that current branches will continue to evolve and speciate. Using the
phylogenetic tree of life, here are some inferences about the potential of a lineage:
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1. The higher the amount of species diversity at a given point in time, the higher the
chance for speciation of a lineage at that point in time.
2. The less amount of species diversity at a given point in time, the greater the potential
for speciation of a lineage in the future.
If we are to accept these inferences, we can conclude that all lineages at any point in time
hold potential for speciation. During times of high diversity, a lineage is more likely to branch.
When there is less species diversity, each lineage holds a huge amount of potential. This
potential matters because, as we saw with the single-celled eukaryote, a great amount of life
could come from that lineage no matter how insignificant it may seem at the time. Extinction of a
single species, the termination of a lineage, is absolute loss of incredible potential.
The lineage must be respected as having a moral relevance to all life. Just as the sun
which is the origin of all energy for life on Earth must not be purposefully destroyed, the lineages
of life also must not be destroyed. Purposeful extinction is wrong, because it betrays the lineage
of life, of which we are a part.

Biodiversity
In order to have biodiversity there must exist a wide variety of genes both between
species and among species (United Nations, 1992). Human actions have reached a scale of
worldwide environmental destruction, one where our land management has ended in absolute
loss of species and ecosystems that might have lasted for thousands of years to come. These
environments hosted unique lineages that were tailored to their ecosystems – lineages which are
now lost forever. Loss of biological diversity on a worldwide scale means that we have caused
the absolute loss of billions of lineages.
If we as moral agents are obligated to learn from our harmful mistakes, then we must
look back on those human developments that caused extinctions and acknowledge that there
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were alternatives to these destructive actions, especially in the case of the Palouse where many
times the alternatives were recommended by scientists yet still ignored (Black et al., 1997).
Ethical alternatives exist which can procure our human needs without causing absolute loss. This
is where our ethical obligations reside: choosing the option which does not endanger the lineages
of life.

Duty and Restoration
Andrew Light wrote that philosophers of science and the environment should seek to
influence environmental policies, in order to influence real change in the world (Light, 2003). I
make the following argument about our duty as moral agents to make restitution for harms and
losses we have caused, specifically those caused to lineages and their nurturing ecosystems as
occurred on the Palouse.
Restoration of the Palouse Prairie ecosystem will not result in an ecosystem equivalent to
that of the original prairie. Planting native species will help aid in ecosystem function, but the
landscape is now changed by the introduced species that have gained advantage on the Palouse.
However, although the restored ecosystem would not be equivalent, some ecosystem functions
would regain function. For example, restoration would provide more pollinator pathways,
increase soil biodiversity and resilience, regrow biological soil crust to help prevent erosion, and
restore ecosystem functions which are not maintained in an agricultural landscape. Restoration
can also help strengthen any lineages which have been endangered, such as those organisms
endemic to the Palouse. Thus, the action of reparation on the Palouse is necessary and beneficial.
In current times nearly all ecosystems on Earth have been affected, directly or indirectly,
by humans. The idea of nature as a separate entity from humans is out of date. It is good to value
and preserve these landscapes that are less altered than not, and to attempt to protect and restore
them to our ability; however, acceptance that humans will always be contributors to their
67

ecosystems is imperative for absolving the harms already inflicted to those lineages. As we make
restorations as reparation, we must remember that humans exist as residents of the ecosystem. In
a resilient ecosystem, humans and non-humans alike will hold responsibilities to one another
(Whyte, 2018).
Eric Katz focused his argument on restoration and wrote that an ecosystem is
“fundamentally different” once it is altered by humans, and only is restored to serve human
interest (Katz, 2003). This means that the ecosystem will never be the same once it is restored,
but also that humans are not regarded in the same way as the rest of living organisms. I agree that
even if we can imagine a theoretical replacement ecosystem in which every single property and
soil nutrient are exactly the same as the original, it would be practically impossible to do so in
real life. So yes, a human grown forest is different from a non-human grown forest. However, I
argue that restoring a forest, or even designing a forest and managing it, would allow the living
residents to have their own purpose and good, thereby serving more than just human interest.
Even if humans had influence on how the forest was created, that does not change the essential
biological mechanisms of which the living beings are comprised. Human-made artifacts can be
used by animals for their own purposes, and in large cities (artifacts) non-human living beings
are adapting and living out their lives to the full extent of their purpose. A tree planted by a
human hand is still a tree. Even if restoration is created for the purpose of human benefit, the
intent of its creation has no physical or biological alteration on the functions of the ecosystem
itself, meaning that an ecosystem ought not be valued by the intent of its creators, but by the
quality and quantity of diverse lineages which reside within.
As Andrew Light argued, a restored ecosystem has an advantage over an ecosystem
damaged by humans and left on its own (Light, 2003). I agree and argue that humans cannot be
separated from their ecosystems. As moral agents we can only interact positively or negatively
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with them. For example, restoration of an agricultural landscape is overall a positive alteration of
the land given its benefits to greater amounts of lineages in the ecosystem. Conversion of an
entire functioning ecosystem to agriculture (specifically agriculture which demands complete
dominance over the land when there are sustainable, positive agricultural practices) is an overall
negative. This form of agriculture predominantly benefits one lineage, the homo sapiens, as well
as the limited lineages of crops and domesticated animals which cannot measure up to the
diversity of lineages found in an ecosystem.
Katz also explained that human-attributed value of a restored forest is less than that of a
non-human grown forest (Katz, 2003). I argue that a change in human value, much like intent of
the creator, makes no change in the biological functionality of the forest. Therefore, even though
a restored ecosystem will not have the same human-attributed value or perfectly recreate the
original landscape, restoration is still a beneficial interaction, and therefore the right action to
take as reparation for our unethical destruction of the ecosystem.

Conclusion
In an attempt to make these ethical arguments applicable to our every-day lives and the
choices we must face going forward, I will suggest that all lineages be granted the following
freedoms, for the benefit of all life on this planet:
1) Freedom of environment: humans ought not destroy those environmental pressures which
drive natural selection in a landscape.
2) Freedom of perpetuity: humans ought not end a lineage purposefully or make land-altering
decisions that will lead to the end of a lineage.
3) Freedom of adaptation: humans ought not prevent a lineage from following its own
unhindered course of evolution.
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The classification of lineage is granted to a group of living organisms that share unique
genetic traits. For example, one species carries a lineage, while the genus also carries a larger
lineage. A lineage is a perpetual string of life formed by the passing of genetic information
between generations of living organisms and is not defined by a single organism, but by a group
of organisms.
There is a difference between protection of a lineage and leaving a lineage unhindered.
As reparation, we must protect and restore those lineages we have damaged. But this does not
hold us to the obligation of protecting every lineage that exists on earth, because the process of
evolution itself may lead to the extinction of some species regardless of human cause. The point
of un-hinderance is that we do not prevent a lineage from adapting and evolving over time.
Human developments can and necessarily will cause some destruction of ecosystems, which is
only morally acceptable when all rules are followed. Freedom of environment maintains the
ecosystem under which lineages are adapting and prevents large disturbances that may harm the
lineage.
Ultimately, it is our moral obligation as humans to make ethical choices in our interaction
with the land, and not to hinder the lineages which reside within our ecosystems. The lineage of
life is shared between all organisms, and protecting one helps ensure that the process of life itself
is not betrayed for all living things. Lineage, much like the lives of all organisms, need not have
an ultimate purpose in order to have moral relevance. As demonstrated on the Palouse Prairie,
the actions of the few can have devastating consequences for an entire ecosystem, which is why I
recommend that if these freedoms are impeded upon, then reparations made in the form of
restoration must occur – including restorations to the Palouse Prairie.
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Wittgenstein on Reasonable Doubt and Calling Bullshit
Frank Hernández1
The University of Texas at El Paso
Abstract: In this essay I analyze a passage from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. This
excerpt contains the expression “O, rubbish!” (Ach Unsinn), which I consider to be closely related
to the notions of “bullshit” developed by Harry Frankfurt and Gerald A. Cohen. The relevance of
this essay is illustrated with lively examples, both related to contemporary society and identified
by Wittgenstein about 70 years ago. The paper is organized in six sections containing 1) an
introduction to the topic, 2) an explanation of “bullshit” as found in the works of Frankfurt and
Cohen, 3) an explanation of Wittgenstein’s work on certainty and propositions beyond doubt, 4)
an identification of reasonable and unreasonable doubt and their connection to “bullshit”, 5) an
explanation of the different kinds of “bullshit” with the intention of mapping them in relation to
each other, and 6) a summarizing conclusion. The main purpose of this paper is to expound on
Wittgenstein’s views on “bullshit” and relate them to contemporary philosophy of nonsense.
One might simply say “O, rubbish!” to someone who wanted to make objections
to the propositions that are beyond doubt. That is, not reply to him but admonish
him. (OC 495)

1. Introduction
Harry Frankfurt first investigated the phenomenon of ‘bullshit’ in his 1986 paper, On
Bullshit, which later became a book of the same name in 2005. In this essay, I focus on Frankfurt’s
original paper as well as on Gerald A. Cohen’s response in his 2002 paper, Deeper into Bullshit.
My main purpose is to argue that already in 1951 Ludwig Wittgenstein conceived a very similar
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phenomenon while dealing with different philosophical concerns. That is, he arrived at this idea
after theorizing about the unreliability of certain kinds of skepticism. Nonetheless, ‘bullshit’, or
‘rubbish’ (Unsinn), as seems to be the case from Wittgenstein’s work, was fundamentally different
to Frankfurt’s and Cohen’s ideas.
With that in mind, my three aims are to 1) explain a variety of concepts found in
Wittgenstein’s philosophy relevant to the present discussion, 2) argue that Wittgenstein had a kind
of ‘bullshit’ in mind when theorizing unreasonable doubt, and 3) argue that the kind of ‘bullshit’
that Wittgenstein had in mind is essentially different in meaningful ways from the kinds of
‘bullshit’ that Frankfurt and Cohen had in mind. I focus primarily on Wittgenstein’s last work, On
Certainty (OC), which covers primarily what is deemed Wittgenstein’s work in epistemology,
especially the threat of skepticism and Moorean certainties2. Wherever I refer to other texts, I do
so peripherally and only in order to justify my interpretation of OC.
2. What is bullshit?
The difference between ‘bullshit’ and ‘lies’, Frankfurt explains, is that the liar, when lying, says
something they believe to be false with the intention of deceiving the audience into thinking that
it is true, or vice versa.3 For example, think of politicians who tell their constituents that a tax-cut
will benefit them, even if all available evidence indicates the contrary (assuming that this is the
case). It might turn out to be true that the tax-cut will benefit them (maybe it helps bring more jobs
to their community, etc.) but because all the evidence known by the politician at the time of the
utterance indicates that the tax-cut would actually harm the community and only by luck would
this not be the case, we can say that the politician was lying.
The bullshitter, on the other hand, does not need to have an intention to deceive. For
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These are truisms that George Edward Moore identified in his famous papers Proof of an External World and A
Defence of Common Sense.
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Frankfurt 2002, p. 3.
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example, think of politicians who claim without any evidence that there was voter fraud during an
election. The reason they are not lying is that they have no reason to believe that there was or not
voter fraud (assuming that this is the case) because they have no evidence to back either claim. In
backing any of these opposing views they are not intending to deceive, which would require them
to promote a view that they know to be false (or vice versa). Rather they might have other
intentions which have no connection to the truth value of their statements, e.g. they might be
gathering support by energizing their base, etc. In this case the politician is not lying, but
bullshitting.
It is worth mentioning that the bullshitter needs not completely lack an intention to deceive.
Cohen pointed this out when arguing that “advertisers may not care whether what they say is true,
but they do care about what their audience is caused to believe.”4 This led him to conclude that
some instances of (Frankfurtian) bullshit are not so different from lying. In responding to Cohen,
Frankfurt argued that advertisers (or people who act in a similar manner) are liars only
“incidentally or by accident,” but “their most fundamental commitment is as bullshitters” because
they “generally decide what they are going to say [...] without caring what the truth is.” 5 In other
words, some bullshitters might be lying when they deceive their audience, but they are not
primarily aiming to deceive their audience. It just turns out that by deceiving them they reach
whatever goals they may have (like selling their products, etc.).
This of course has nothing to do with the truth value of what they say. According to
Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever, a way of distinguishing a liar from a bullshitter, is that the liar
must care about the truth or falsehood of their statements, while the bullshitter “isn’t
guided by or motivated by a desire to track the way the world is,” not even in order to deceive. 6
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Correspondingly, (Frankfurtian) bullshit is distinguished by the lack of caring for the truth value
of a statement, or when this caring occurs only incidentally.
Cohen distinguished his account, known as “deep bullshit,”7 from Frankfurt’s because,
according to him, Frankfurtian bullshit is closer to “trivial or insincere talk or writing,” having an
intentional nature, i.e. (Frankfurtian) bullshit is the product of (someone’s) bullshitting, where
‘bullshiting’ means saying something while not caring for its truth value. Cohen’s definition, on
the other hand, has to do with instances of “nonsense” or “rubbish,” related to “the character of
its output,”8 i.e. x is (Cohenian) bullshit iff its output has the character of bullshit regardless
whether the person who produced it was or not bullshitting. Cohenian bullshit is centered on the
expression itself, as opposed to Frankfurtian bullshit which is centered on the intentions of those
who utter it.
In Cohen’s view, those who produce bullshit need not be bullshitting at all. They might
just be producing bullshit, while deeply caring for truth, or conversely might be purposefully
transmitting falsehood, but bullshit is produced nonetheless. According to Cappelen and Dever,
another way of characterizing Cohenian bullshit is as “gibberish” or “meaningless speech.” 9What
is said by Cohenian bullshitters is either “meaningless words” or a “meaningless combination of
meaningful words.”10
Some have argued that Cohen’s characterization is misguided and illegitimately charges
some speech as bullshit. For instance, Tom Burdge argues that “[Cohenian-bullshit] accusations
are often instances of epistemic trespass,”11 instead of legitimate accounts of bullshit. I do not
delve into defending or criticizing Cohen’s view, rather I take it as a referent (in the same way
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that he takes Frankfurt’s view) in order to locate Wittgenstein’s view within what I call the
‘bullshit plane’.
Thus, there are at least two kinds of bullshit: Frankfurtian bullshit, or F-bullshit hereafter,
and Cohenian bullshit, or C-bullshit hereafter. The former is, as Cohen describes it, ‘bull-centered’
or based on the intentions of those who utter it. The latter is ‘shit-centered’ or based on the
expression itself without a necessary connection to the intentions of those who utter it. The purpose
of this paper is to identify Wittgensteinian bullshit, or W-bullshit hereafter, in relation to these
two.
3. Certainty and propositions beyond doubt
In order to argue my case, I must a) define what ‘certainty’ means for Wittgenstein, b)
explain the difference between ‘subjective certainty’ and ‘objective certainty’, and c) introduce
the notion of ‘propositions beyond doubt’. To begin, I need to clarify that ‘certainty’ is not the
same as ‘knowledge’. ‘Knowledge’ is taken to mean justified true belief. Even if this is not right,
it is inconsequential for the purposes of this paper. Assuming it is true, and shedding light on the
fact that ‘certainty’ is also a kind of belief, the main difference between them must lie on the
remaining parts of the definition. Certainty is not justified12 and is also not true:
Certainty is as it were a tone of voice in which one declares how things are, but
one does not infer from the tone of voice that one is justified. (OC 30)
Wittgenstein intended to prove that the things that G. E. Moore claimed to know, such as
‘the external world exists’, are not really known by him but he is only certain of them.
Essentially, one does not infer from the existence of objects such as one’s hands the existence of
the external world. Actually doing so would be meaningless because to say that ‘the external
world exists’ is to say nothing (meaningful) at all. Claiming to know, or claiming to hold a
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I have some reservations for outright calling certainty ‘unjustified belief’ just because W-bullshit might also fall
under the same category, as will become clear from my argument.
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justified true belief, that ‘the external world exists’ is senseless or a tautology (TLP 6.126,
6.1265). One can only be certain that ‘the external world exists’. The difference is that
knowledge requires justification. Certainty on the other hand is the basis for all justification. I.e.
We are not justified in believing that ‘the external world exists’, etc., but if we were to doubt it
none of our justified beliefs derived from this basic belief would be coherent. In that sense, we
must “[replace] Moore’s “I know” by “I am of the unshakable conviction”” (OC 86). For
example, I cannot infer from ‘here is one hand’ that ‘the external world exists’, rather I must
assume that ‘the external world exists’ so I can say things like ‘here is one hand’.
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock described this distinction as logical. Certainty has the property,
according to her, that it is logically incoherent for it to be false, because if it were false it would
be incoherent to say anything at all. For example, I wouldn’t be able to say ‘I am 23 years old’ if
that ‘the world has existed for longer than 5 minutes’ were false. This impossibility of mistake
makes justification futile or tautological: “it is in believing, not in knowing, that justification is
optional,”13 but by being optional it is also unnecessary: “That is the meaning of Occam’s razor”
(TLP 3.328).
The difference between subjective and objective certainty, as explained by Wittgenstein,
is that subjective certainty consists in a personal conviction, e.g. ‘I believe that I’m living in the
year 2021’. While objective certainty consists in the logical impossibility of mistake, e.g. ‘2021
is a year’. Michael Kober described the former as “a kind of being sure, of confidence, or trust.”14
But as Moyal-Sharrock emphasized, this is not what Wittgenstein prioritized: “although the
certainty he is striving to define is a certainty that stands fast for us individually [...] it cannot be
merely personal [...] The certainty in question, though in a way personal, is also a shared or
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Kober 2018, p. 472.
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collective certainty.”15 Wittgenstein focused instead, according to her, on objective certainty (or
“intersubjective certainty” as Kober preferred16), which is not a matter of personal conviction, but
about being certain that some things are beyond doubt because doubt is logically impossible in
those cases.17 Objective certainty can be, according to Moyal-Sharrock,
a) a doxastic (belief) attitude that appears as
i) a disposition towards ㅡ, or
ii) an occurrence (taking-hold) of ㅡ, or
b) a category that appears as a foundational certainty consisting of ㅡ
rules or instruments of grammar.18
This complicates things in explaining the nature of W-bullshit, but for now I shall focus
on the fact that objective certainty needs to be instantiated by actual certainties, or propositions
beyond doubt. E.g. ‘the external world exists’, ‘green is a color’, etc.:
We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical
proposition, how the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human
blood is called, that other human beings have blood and call it “blood”. (OC 340)
Propositions like ‘the external world exists’, ‘green is a color’, etc., serve as logical or
grammatical rules, rather than falsifiable propositions. By virtue of their indubitability, because
they rest at the bottom of our belief or epistemic systems, they are rather determinants of the
truth value of other (empirical) propositions. In Moyal-Sharrock’s view, it is even wrong to call
them ‘propositions’ because they lack the property of bipolarity.19 In contrast, these
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propositions, which Wittgenstein deemed “grammatical propositions” or “hinges”, are relieved
of their propositional status insofar as they are beyond doubt (OC 58, 341).20 They take the
form of “ready-to-use rules,”21 which “condition our acts and thoughts.”22 They are neither true
nor false. According to Wittgenstein, they rather set the tone for judging the truth or falsehood
of empirical propositions (OC 58, 94, 205, TLP 5.1363). In other words, they cannot be true nor
false because they help determine what truth and falsehood are in the first place, and something
cannot both determine what truth is and be true at the same time: “If the true is what is
grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false” (OC 205). For the sake of consistency, I use
‘propositions beyond doubt’ when referring to these nonpropositional, grammatical claims,
while acknowledging that they are not propositions in the correct use of the term.
Two questions follow from these remarks: 1) What is the difference between propositions
beyond doubt and bullshit, if neither of them are said to be true nor false? 2) How are they different
if both are nonsensical23? I proceed to answer the first question and will answer the second one
further below: Bullshit does not lack truth value, as is the case with propositions beyond doubt.
The latter have no truth value at all, whereas utterances of the former do have a truth value, but it
is the lack of caring for this truth value that determines their bullshit-ness. In other words, if
someone utters a proposition beyond doubt, they are saying something that is neither true nor false
(which, according to Wittgenstein, means that they are not saying anything at all 24). On the other
hand, if someone utters bullshit, they might be saying something that is true or false, but their lack
of caring for its truth or falsehood determines its being bullshit.
This of course is not the case with C-bullshit. Hence, we need another condition to
20
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distinguish propositions beyond doubt from both F- and C-bullshit. Perhaps more importantly,
propositions beyond doubt are regulative of their language games, whereas bullshit is not. In
Wittgenstein’s view, propositions beyond doubt determine the rules of grammar for a language
game, such that if we doubt them or reject them we couldn’t play a game at all. This is not the
case with bullshit. For instance, if there was no bullshit in a language game we could perfectly
play it. One might even say that a game is expected to be played without bullshit. Of course that
is not to say that one cannot play a game if there is bullshit, rather that ideally there shouldn’t be
any bullshit if we want to play a game correctly; think here of people who play games without
regard for their rules.
4. Reasonable and unreasonable doubt
To arrive at the position where we can accept that Wittgenstein had in mind a kind of
bullshit, I must differentiate between reasonable and unreasonable doubt. There are two ways of
understanding this distinction: a) Wittgenstein distinguished between doubts that can and cannot
be doubted by a reasonable person (OC 219, 220, 323). In this case we can say that a reasonable
doubt is that which can be doubted by a reasonable person, whereas an unreasonable doubt is that
which cannot. The question of who is a reasonable person is more or less neglected by
Wittgenstein, but it can be said that anyone who has a rational attitude in relation to the collective
world picture (Weltbild), which contains the collection of propositions beyond doubt, and is
mentally stable, qualifies as a reasonable person. According to Moyal-Sharrock, it would be
unreasonable for someone to doubt propositions beyond doubt because “[it] is logically impossible
to doubt or be wrong about some beliefs whilst remaining within the ken of normal human
understanding:”25
When we say that we know that such and such …, we mean that any reasonable
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person in our position would also know it, that it would be a piece of unreason to
doubt it. Thus Moore too wants to say not merely that he knows that he etc. etc.,
but also that anyone endowed with reason in his position would know it just the
same. (OC 325)
b) At the same time, one can also read Wittgenstein’s views on reasonable and
unreasonable doubt without any regard for the kind of person who is doubting. Even though it is
commonsensical to say that someone raising an unreasonable doubt is being unreasonable, we can
think of cases when someone completely reasonable raises a doubt about the existence of the
external world or about green being a color. Maybe they are doubting it as a joke or as a thought
experiment, etc. But isn’t doubt in these cases unreasonable independently of the person’s
intentions? This view is not uncontroversial and I won’t attempt to defend it in this paper.
Another thing to consider is the question about what is deemed reasonable or
unreasonable: “what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa” (OC 336). Kober used
the example of “Einstein changing our views of space and time, mass and energy” to argue that
some considerations “may later cause us to revise some of our certainties.”26 Michael Williams
created a mechanism based on four factors (semantic, methodological, dialectical and economic)
to determine which propositions can be reasonably beyond doubt.27 Though important
considerations, I focus here on the basic propositions that most people would agree to if someone
were to ask ‘what is reasonably beyond doubt?’: things like ‘the external world exists’, ‘red is a
color’, etc.
Moyal-Sharrock claimed that “[on] Wittgenstein’s view, ‘Red is a colour’ is as nonsensical
as: ‘Red is not a colour.’”28 I am not of the same opinion, as long as her opinion is that both are
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nonsensical in the same way, which seems to be the case because she did not distinguish between
different kinds of nonsense. It is true that both claims are nonsensical. The latter is nonsensical
because it violates a grammatical rule by indirectly causing to cast a doubt against a proposition
beyond doubt, while the former is nonsensical because it is the grammatical rule or proposition
beyond doubt itself, and grammatical rules “stand outside the bounds of sense,” because they are
not falsifiable, thus have no sense (OC 58).29 But I have reasons to believe that the kind of
nonsense of ‘Red is a colour’ and ‘Red is not a colour’ is not the same. I.e. The former is nonsense
due to its indubitability, but the latter is nonsense because it is bullshit.
5. Admonishing bullshit
First, it is intuitive to say that unreasonable doubt is bullshit. I would call bullshit if
someone asked, for instance, ‘how do you know that red is a color?’. It is also meaningless because
raising a doubt against something meaningless doesn’t give the doubt a meaning. Additionally,
just as other kinds of bullshit, it is not regulative of any language game. Nonetheless, it seems that
unreasonable doubt might lack the other condition, which I said is unique to F-bullshit, i.e.
disregard for truth value. This is because it is not obvious that the skeptic (of the kind that would
ask things like ‘how do you know that red is a color?’) is
doubting with disregard for truth value. It also seems that unreasonable doubt entirely lacks truth
value, just as propositions beyond doubt, because there is no reason to believe that doubting
something gives the doubt a truth value (TLP 4.003). This definitely complicates things, and I
should consider them for future endeavors, but the fact that it has qualities that allow at least
another kind of bullshit (C-) to be called bullshit (that is, intuitiveness, nonregulativeness and
meaninglessness) I can justifiably call unreasonable doubt ‘W-bullshit’.
As previously stated, I am concerned with the difference between W-bullshit and other
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kinds of ‘bullshit’. For this, I introduce the distinction between claimant- and challenger-bullshit.30
F- and C-bullshit fall under the former kind because their instances take the form of claims. For
example, ‘(even though I have no evidence for or against it) there was voter fraud during the last
election’ (F-bullshit) or ‘social distancing is communism’31 (C-bullshit). W-bullshit on the other
hand takes the form of challenges to already established claims. W-bullshit is like asking ‘how do
you know that your name is … ?’ (OC 628) ‘how do you know that the earth has existed for a long
time now’ (OC 138, 187, 188, 190, 231) ‘how do you know that the earth is round and not flat?’
(OC 147). I presume, though not conclusively, that it should also include all sorts of (unreasonable)
skepticism and denialism like ‘how do you know that human-induced climate change is not a
hoax?’, ‘how do you know that COVID-19 is real’, etc. As Wittgenstein himself pointed out:
‘We are quite sure of it’ does not mean just that every single person is certain of
it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and
education. (OC 298)
To differentiate between claimant- and challenger-kinds of bullshit, consider that one thing
is to produce bullshit when claiming something, while another is to produce it when challenging
something that was already claimed, or is implicitly claimed. Both kinds of bullshit can cause each
other. For instance, Bergstrom and West argue that (claimant-) bullshit “undermines our ability to
trust information in general,”32 which creates an ideal environment for challenger-bullshit to
develop. On the other hand, if the presence of too much challenger-bullshit causes distrust of the
evidence, it makes it easier for claimant-bullshit to develop. So the possibility that one causes the
other is conceivable. Then, if we take into consideration causation (one thing cannot cause itself)
and the fact that claimant- and challenger-bullshit have different logical forms, we can conclude

30

I borrowed the claimant/challenger distinction from Williams 2007.
See https://ktla.com/news/local-news/demonstrators-gather-in-huntington-beach-to-protest-states-stay-at-homeorder-and-defying-social-distancing-rules/.
32
Bergstrom and West 2020, p. 8. The reason for my assumption that Bergstrom and West refer exclusively to
claimant-bullshit in this quote is that I doubt that they are considering challenger-bullshit anywhere in their analysis.
31

85

that they are different things ㅡ different kinds of bullshit. For instance, ‘human-induced climate
change is a hoax’ and ‘how do you know that human-induced climate change is not a hoax?’
would be different according to the reasons just provided.
But in order to map W-bullshit in the ‘bullshit plane’, I must also locate it in relation to a
second axis. As I said before, the difference between F- and C-bullshit is that the former is
intention-based, whereas the latter is expression-based. It is not clear where W-bullshit lies in this
distinction. It is complicated to exactly locate W-bullshit within the intention/expression axis,
given that a) it is both an attitude (intention) and a category (expression), and b) it is both
dependent (intention) and independent (expression) of a person’s reasonableness. Hence, we
should consider both possibilities, which I highlight in the following table:
Table 1. Bullshit plane
Intention-based

Expression-based

Claimant

F-bullshit

C-bullshit

Challenger

W-bullshit₁

W-bullshit₂

6. Conclusion
I have argued that unreasonable doubt, which is the kind of doubt raised against
propositions beyond doubt (certainties that instantiate the kind of certainty that is based on the
impossibility of logical mistake), is a kind of bullshit. This kind of bullshit is distinguished from
other kinds of bullshit because it is challenger-bullshit, in opposition to claimant-bullshit. The
latter is constituted by claims which are i) either made without regard for truth value or ii)
meaningless. The former is constituted by challenges to already established claims which are
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indubitable. I have also said that it is complicated to say with complete assurance whether Wbullshit is intention- or expression-based, but this and other complications must be dealt with in
future endeavors. All in all, the most important contribution of this paper is to acknowledge
Wittgenstein’s continuing contributions to the philosophy of nonsense, given that much of his
work was devoted to identifying it.
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